The use of critical tracking events and key data elements to improve the traceability of food throughout the supply chain to reduce the burden of foodborne illnesses by Miller, Benjamin David
  
 
 
 
 
The Use of Critical Tracking Events and Key Data Elements to Improve the 
Traceability of Food throughout the Supply Chain to Reduce the Burden of 
Foodborne Illnesses. 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
BY 
 
 
 
 
Benjamin David Miller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Dr. Craig Hedberg 
 
 
 
 
December 2013 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Benjamin David Miller 2013 
 
  i 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Craig Hedberg, for his support and guidance 
throughout this process.  Without Craig’s passion for food safety and many years 
of experience none of this work would have happened.   
 
I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Minnesota Department of 
Agriculture and Minnesota Department of Health; Dr. Carrie Rigdon for her 
thoughtful approach to traceability work, Dr. Kirk Smith for sharing his wealth of 
knowledge regarding epidemiology and outbreak investigations, and Dr. Heidi 
Kassenborg for supporting an environment of exploration and risk-taking, without 
which, much of this work may never have happened. 
 
Special thanks are due to Dr. Jennifer McEntire and Tejas Bhatt at the Institute of 
Food Technologists for inviting me into the inner workings of traceability at the 
national level on several Task Orders, and ultimately, the FDA Traceability Pilot.  
I learned far more than I contributed to these processes and for that I am 
extremely grateful. 
 
A very special thank you to Dr. Bruce Welt at the University of Florida for helping 
me to see traceability from a non-regulatory perspective and broadening my 
thinking on what was ultimately possible to improve traceability in our food 
supply.  His willingness to share and discuss his thoughts on the conceptual 
framework for traceability became the glue that holds this work together as a 
cohesive document.  
 
Much of this work resulted as a collaborative effort working with many public 
health professionals in a number of states.  Without their contributions much of 
this work would not have been possible.  More importantly, their continued 
  ii 
dedication to food safety has undoubtedly prevented an untold number of 
illnesses and underscores why improvements in traceability are so necessary.   
 
The FDA should also be acknowledged for their funding and creation of Rapid 
Response Teams in nineteen states over the past five years.  These federal 
investments created the foundation for much of the traceability work that occurs 
at a national level.   
 
Thanks as well to Bryanne Shaw and Matt Forstner in the MDA microbiology 
laboratory; their dogged determination to isolate the outbreak organism from a 
variety of challenging food matrices has proven invaluable to validating much of 
our traceback work. 
 
Thanks as well to my mother Kathy for her moral and financial support of this 
degree. 
 
Finally, I thank my wife Debra for supporting me as a “student” over these past 
many years as we both built careers and a family. 
  iii 
Dedication 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my late father, David Miller.  I know he would 
have been proud. 
  iv 
Abstract 
 
From 2005 to 2010 many large nationwide foodborne illness outbreaks were 
associated with commercially distributed food.  In some of these outbreaks the 
source was not immediately identifiable because product distribution information 
was incomplete or difficult to collect or interpret and the outbreak vehicle could 
not be traced to its source.  The primary objective of this research is to 
characterize and propose how data could be more systematically defined and 
collected throughout the food supply chain to more rapidly determine the source 
of foodborne illness outbreaks.   
 
This research proposes a conceptual framework for addressing the food 
traceability challenge.  While specific technical solutions exist, none are capable 
of satisfying all needs of the various food supply chains.  What has been missing 
is a common conceptual framework within which a variety of solutions can co-
exist.  Any such framework must preserve flexibility, scalability and adaptability.  
Individual technical solutions must be capable of satisfying requirements of the 
food industry while simplifying and improving aggregation and interpretation of 
key data for both industry and regulators faced with outbreak investigations. 
 
To understand the development of the conceptual framework, traceback methods 
by state regulatory agencies were used to complement traditional 
epidemiological cluster investigation methods and confirmed hazelnuts as the 
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vehicle in a multi-state outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 infections. This outbreak 
investigation demonstrates the use of product traceback data to rapidly test an 
epidemiological hypothesis.   
 
This conceptual framework was validated during an outbreak of 6 cases of 
Salmonella Newport infection, which identified fresh blueberries as the cause. 
Initially, traditional traceback methods involving the review of invoices and bills-
of-lading were used to attempt to identify the source of the outbreak.  When 
these methods failed, novel traceback methods were used. This investigation 
demonstrates the emerging concepts of Critical Tracking Events (CTEs) and Key 
Data Elements (KDE) related for food product tracing. The use of these shopper-
cased data and the event data that were queried by investigators demonstrates 
the potential utility of consciously designed CTEs and KDEs at critical points in 
the supply chain to better facilitate product tracing.  
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Introduction 
Traceability is “a record keeping system designed to track the flow of product or 
product attributes through the production process or supply chain” (1).  
Traceability, in order to protect public health, should encompass all aspects of 
the food system, starting at the point of harvest and continuing to retailers.  
Animal feed, as well as food packaging, should also be included in a robust food 
chain traceability system.   
 
Over the past decade there have been a number of large nationwide outbreaks 
involving commercially distributed foods that have resulted in hundreds or 
thousands of cases of confirmed illness (2–8).  In many of these outbreaks, 
traditional epidemiological methods have not quickly identified a statically 
associated food exposure and traceback investigations have been needed to 
help characterize the probable food vehicle.  These traceback investigations 
could be completed more rapidly and with a greater degree of accuracy if the 
current data requirements for food traceability were better defined and aligned 
across the food supply chain and if regulatory agencies were able to share this 
information more quickly and accurately between local, state, and federal 
officials.  For businesses, large foodborne outbreaks have very measurable costs 
in terms of lost sales, lost confidence, and increased morbidity and mortality (9–
12). 
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The primary objective of this research is to characterize and propose how data 
could be more systematically defined and collected throughout the food supply 
chain to more rapidly determine the source of foodborne illness outbreaks.   
The specific aims of this research are to: 
1.  Propose a systematic approach to analyzing processes throughout the 
food supply chain so that critical processes and key data elements related 
to food production and distribution can be collected in a consistent manner 
to better facilitate food traceability. 
2. Illustrate the complexity of a multistate regulatory investigation using 
current data sources in the food supply chain that have not been 
optimized for traceability. 
3. Demonstrate the potential utility of using non-traditional data sources 
(shopper card information and point-of-sale database information) to 
traceback an outbreak of Salmonella associated with blueberries. 
 
Literature Review 
Traceback investigations 
Traceback investigations are used as an extension of an epidemiologic 
foodborne illness investigation to determine the source of an outbreak.  
Numerous foodborne outbreaks over the past several years have demonstrated 
the importance and the need for rapid traceability of food products sold to 
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consumers (3,6,7,13–17).  The Food Safety Modernization Act required the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine how technology could be used by 
the food industry and the FDA to improve traceability in the food supply chain 
(18). 
Traceforward investigations 
Traceforward, sometime called “tracking”, is the capability to find a product based 
on specific criteria while it is handled along each point of the supply chain. This 
type of traceability is typically used by industry when recalling contaminated food 
products and can be challenging when recalling products manufactured with a 
contaminated ingredient (7).   
External Traceability 
External traceability represents transactions between companies in the food 
supply chain that capture data and information about specific product movement 
between companies (19).   
The food industry is required to maintain external traceability through existing 
business records under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and this information is 
generally available in most traceback investigations (20).   
Internal Traceability 
Internal traceability represents product transformations or movements that occur 
within a single company of processing facility in order to identify all inputs used to 
manufacture a finished product. Internal traceability is generally more difficult to 
implement for the food industry because it requires additional processes and 
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data capture points in order to track incoming ingredients and link them to 
discrete finished products.  If internal traceability is not practiced, this can result 
in the loss of supply chain traceability for that location in a traceback 
investigation.   
Outbreaks Involving Traceback Investigations 
Foodborne illness outbreaks where traceback investigations have been 
conducted typically involve a common set of criteria (21): 
1. There is a PFGE subtype cluster of cases that likely represents a 
common source outbreak; and 
2. Cases occur in multiple locations or jurisdictions (particularly if they 
occur in multiple states); and 
3.  Interviews of case-patients reveal no obvious common exposure 
that can explain the outbreak, suggesting that the outbreak vehicle 
is a commercially distributed food item; and  
4.  A vehicle cannot be clearly implicated with traditional 
epidemiologic, laboratory, and environmental investigation methods 
alone.  
 
A few examples of such outbreaks where a traceback investigation played a 
significant role in determining the source of the outbreak include a 1990 and 
1993 outbreaks of S. Javiana and S. Montevideo associated with tomatoes from 
the Southeastern United States (13); a 2006 nationwide outbreak of E.coli 
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O157:H7 associated with spinach (2); a 2006 E.coli O157:H7 outbreak 
associated with iceberg lettuce consumed in fast-food chains (15); a nationwide 
S. Saintpaul outbreak in 2008 originally associated with tomatoes and later linked 
to jalapeno and Serrano peppers (3); a nationwide S. Typhimurium in 2009 
associated with peanut butter and other peanut containing products traced to two 
manufacturing facilities in Georgia and Texas (6,7); a 2007 cyclosporiasis 
outbreak in Canada associated with basil (14); an E.coli O157:H7 outbreak in 
2011 associated with hazelnuts (16); a S. Newport outbreak in 2010 associated 
with blueberries (17); and a S. Braenderup outbreak in the Southern United 
States associated with mangoes (22).   
Current Regulation in United States 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 
Bioterrorism attacks using anthrax and mailed letters in 2001 prompted Congress 
to pass the “Bioterrorism Act” of 2002 (20).  Section 306 of the Act outlines and 
details the current record keeping requirements for food manufacturers, 
processors, transporters, distributors, brokers, and importers that form the basis 
of the current “one-forward, one-backward’ traceability system in the United 
States.  Farms and restaurants were exempted from the record-keeping 
requirement.   The language of this Act specifies external traceability 
requirements but did not clarify traceability within a firm or facility.  This lack of 
internal traceability has lengthened the time required to accurately identify the 
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source of some large national outbreaks, most notably the Salmonella Saintpaul 
outbreak of 2008 that was initially thought to be associated with tomatoes (3).   
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 
In response to the large number of nationwide outbreaks in the 2000s, the Food 
Safety Modernization Act was signed into law in January 2011.  Section 204 of 
the Act, requires the FDA to establish a product tracing system based on the 
results of several pilot projects examining traceability for high risk produce and 
manufactured food products.  The food industry will be required to maintain more 
complete records for high-risk foods based on the record keeping requirements 
promulgated by the FDA.  This legislation has taken longer to implement that 
specified in the Act itself and the record keeping requirements required for 
industry remains unclear (23).   
 
Current Frameworks and Standards 
In addition to legislation, a number of countries and organizations have 
developed framework guidance documents and some have also established a 
minimum set of voluntary data standards needed for supply chain traceability 
(24).  Many of these international standards encourage the use of the GS1 
standards which are maintained by the international non-profit organization, GS1 
(19). 
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Technologies and Data Structures for Food Traceability 
Traceability Standards 
International non-profit standard organizations have proposed data standards 
allowing supply chain partners to share product information consistently between 
and within food companies throughout the supply chain.  These standards 
specify data formats that are independent of a transfer technology or medium 
(19).   
 
Regulatory requirements for the adoption of a single data standard in the food 
supply chain do not currently exist in the United States (18).   
Summary 
The average supermarket in the United States in 2010 carried over 38,000 items 
(25).  While not all these items were food products, the increased availability of 
more food products to consumers has increased the complexity of the food 
supply chain and makes tracing a food back to its source more difficult.  Between 
1987 and 1997 the number of individual produce items in grocery stores 
increased 94 percent (26).  A number of large nationwide outbreaks have 
demonstrated the need for and the usefulness of improved food traceability (2,6–
8,27). 
 
Systematic improvements in food traceability are required to shorten the time 
required by investigators to trace a suspect food back to its source (18).  
  9 
Improvements in investigatory coordination will also improve response time and 
may prevent additional illnesses in future outbreaks (16,21).   
  10 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of food traceability can be simplified by defining the problem in 
terms of the timing of specific data needs of public health officials and regulators 
during outbreak and traceback investigations.   This shows how the problem may 
be broken into phases where initial phases may proceed rapidly in order to bring 
investigators quickly to points of interest within the supply chain. These time and 
cost saving measures permit thorough investigations where needed with minimal 
changes to operations by supply chain participants.  This leads directly to the 
conceptual model, similar to the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) 
model, which would be used by industry to identify “Critical Tracking Events” 
(CTEs) in their own operations throughout the supply chain.  The powerful 
concept of CTE is gaining wide acceptance by the food industry and has already 
been used to solve previous foodborne outbreaks (15,17). 
 
Finally, this paper proposes methods for fostering technical innovations through 
research and testing by combining stochastic modeling and pilot projects in 
harvesting, processing, distribution and retail food facilities.   
 
Foodborne outbreaks represent a significant burden of illness in the United 
States and internationally causing significant morbidity and mortality (28,29).  
While the majority of these illnesses are of an unknown etiology, a significant 
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number are associated with commercially distributed foods.  As the complexity 
and speed of the food supply increases, private industry, government regulators 
and public health officials have been challenged in tracing potentially implicated 
foods during and after foodborne illness outbreaks.  Notable examples include 
outbreaks associated with spinach, peanut better, shell eggs, fresh produce, and 
pet food (2,6,7,30,31). 
 
As a result of these outbreaks, improved recordkeeping and traceability 
requirements were included in the landmark passage of the Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) in January of 2011.  This Act specifically required the 
Food and Drug Administration to establish pilot projects to explore and evaluate 
methods to rapidly and effectively identify recipients of food to prevent or control 
a foodborne illness outbreak.   
 
The primary goal of food traceability is not food safety.  The primary goal of food 
traceability for public health investigators and regulators is to improve 
investigational efficiency, but in order to do so the food industry must make 
investments in their processes and production systems that allows needed 
information to be collected.  Specifically, the goal of improving food traceability is 
to improve the speed of investigations as well as the accuracy of results.  
Therefore, the problem of food traceability requires a mindset that is first rooted 
in logistics rather than food safety.  Of course, achieving improvements in food 
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traceability will likely result in fewer cases of foodborne illness, reductions in the 
amounts of food discarded, as well as added protection of industry segments 
and/or product brands from erroneous implication in outbreaks.  Also, increasing 
the number of successful outbreak investigations will lead to more opportunities 
to learn from mistakes through environmental assessments, resulting in 
accelerated improvements to food safety throughout the supply chain. Therefore, 
increased food safety is a likely, but secondary benefit of improvements in 
logistical performance related to food traceability.  Successfully improving 
traceability throughout the supply chain relies on the food industry realizing the 
primary benefits of improving logistical performance (by increasing efficiency and 
lowering operating costs) while concurrently complying with improved traceability 
requirements to satisfy the public health and regulatory communities.   
 
While the link between food traceability and food safety exists, there are a few 
layers of activity, action and investment required to better secure that linkage.  
Historically, the food industry and Food and Drug Administration have tended to 
view food traceability exclusively through the lens of food safety rather than 
logistics and that may have slowed innovation and adoption of effective food 
traceability solutions.  Food safety tends to involve conditions of handling, 
processing and production as opposed to movement of products through the 
supply chain.  Specifically, food safety is a quality function whereas food 
traceability is a logistical one.  While safety is always a concern with food, 
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logistics involves a different perspective, different skill sets and different tools 
than production oriented quality control and assurance.   
Currently accepted concepts for food traceability 
Based on current regulatory requirements to maintain one-forward-one-back 
(OFOB) traceability documentation (20), most supply chain participants are 
comfortable with the concepts of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ traceability.  However, 
traceability requires that linkages through each operation are maintained, so 
these definitions of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are not particularly useful in trying to 
comprehend the problem and possible solutions.  Some operators argue that this 
definition is necessary to protect internal proprietary information, but a well-
designed traceability system alleviates these concerns.  By focusing on solving 
‘external’ traceability at the expense of ‘internal’ traceability, effective traceability 
solutions remain elusive. Therefore, eliminating the notions of ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ traceability in favor of the more comprehensive concept of Critical 
Tracking Events (CTEs) that are applicable throughout the supply chain should 
offer greater efficiency as well as data security. 
The old concept of ‘external traceability’ 
Transactions between growers, processors, distributors, shippers, brokers and 
brand owners (Figure 2.1) represent external traceability and all segments of the 
supply chain must participate for such a traceability system to be effective.   
Missing data slows or stymies investigations.  External traceability is largely in 
practice today throughout the supply chain since companies currently maintain 
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records of shipments received from suppliers and shipped to customers for the 
regular business practices of invoicing and payment.   
The old concept of ‘internal traceability’ 
Internal traceability (Figure2.2) requires that food processors or distributors track 
internal inputs that change the identity or configuration of the product they are 
selling.  For food manufacturing, internal traceability may require that all lot code 
or batch information for the ingredients (grain, corn syrup, flavorings, vitamins, 
etc.) that are used be recorded and stored.  For a distributor, internal traceability 
may require that multiple data elements be recorded if cases of product from 
varying lots are used to create a pallet (or an equivalent logistical unit). 
 
What is sometimes referred to as ‘internal traceability’ is not actually traceability, 
but rather a good manufacturing practice.  There is no doubt that these data are 
useful to outbreak investigations, but they are not needed in any investigation 
until they are actually required by investigators due to implication of the specific 
operator in a specific outbreak.  In other words, investigators should only need 
these data from operators implicated as a likely source of contamination.  Forcing 
investigators to dig into these records of each supply chain operator, whether 
implicated or not, wastes precious time of both investigators and operators, 
which may jeopardize the entire investigation.  Relying on these data for routine 
traceability is unwieldy and unnecessary.  Better approaches are needed to more 
quickly identify the most likely sources of contamination in order to avoid wasting 
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precious time and money of operators who should be excluded from an 
investigation. 
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Figure 2.1.  Example of external traceability.  A food manufacturer produces a product and tracks the distribution of that 
product to a distribution and retail location.   
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Figure 2.2.  Example of internal traceability.  A food manufacturer produces a prodcut from three ingredients.  These 
inputs are recorded and related to Lot A of the finished product.   
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An Example Investigation 
Traceability should cover the entire food supply chain; from animal feed to 
finished food products regardless of risk classification.  Numerous foodborne 
outbreaks over the past several years have demonstrated the importance and 
need for rapid traceability of food products sold to consumers.  More rapid 
traceability can aid and clarify foodborne illness investigations by aligning product 
distribution data with epidemiological exposure data.  These investigations could 
be completed more rapidly and with a greater degree of accuracy if current data 
requirements and collection practices for food traceability were better defined 
and aligned across the food supply chain.    
 
Figure 2.3 shows a cluster of illnesses matching a Pulse Field Gel 
Electrophoresis subtype identified by epidemiologists at a state health 
department.  Due to the difficulty and cost of traceback investigations, significant 
clusters of illness must be identified prior to an investigation commencing.  Once 
the cluster has been identified, epidemiologists interview specific cases and try to 
determine commonality such as dining at operations of the same restaurant 
chain.  Further investigation finds that all cases consumed some type of sprout 
containing sandwich at each restaurant location but the source of the sprouts 
remains unclear.    
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Figure 2.3.  Conceptual diagram of a traceback that supports an epidemiologic investigation.   
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While the epidemiological investigation may identify a plausible source, the 
regulatory investigator must trace the likely exposure to a point of convergence 
or commonality in the supply chain in order to identify the “source” of the 
outbreak. 
 
Continuing with the example, once an outbreak vehicle is identified, the 
epidemiological investigation ends with the possible recommendation that 
persons not consume sprout-containing sandwiches at these locations.  The 
traceback investigation is an extension of the epidemiological investigation and it 
serves two purposes: 
1. It supports the epidemiological associations by confirming that temporal 
and physical distribution of suspect products could adequately match the 
case exposures, and; 
2. It further characterizes the source of the outbreak, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a meaningful intervention to protect public health. 
 
In Figure 2.3, this concept is demonstrated when the investigation moves from 
the information generated in the epidemiological interviews to the information 
collected by a food-regulatory agency based on record collection and in-field 
investigations.  An investigation of the invoices and bills-of-lading from each 
restaurant location where a case of illness was reported shows that each 
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restaurant received their sprouts from a different supplier.  Further investigation 
of the records from the suppliers shows that they received their sprouts from a 
number of different growers.  A review of the grow-logs, seed sources, and 
invoices at each of the sprout grower locations shows that all of the seed in 
implicated time frame would have come from a single seed supply company.  A 
review of the lot-codes for the implicated seeds shows a common lot-code of 
seed was used at each grower in the implicated time frame and further 
investigation shows that the lot-code corresponds to a single farm that produced 
all of the questionable seed.   
 
It isn’t until all of these data are collected and analyzed that a truly meaningful 
public health intervention, in the form of seed and sprout recalls and a market 
withdrawal of the implicated lot-code, can be made.  As might be imagined, such 
an investigation is complicated and time and resource intensive.  Often, 
outbreaks subside before investigators are able to pinpoint a cause resulting in 
wasted time and effort of both doing the investigating and those being 
investigated. 
Traceforward investigations 
Traceforward, sometime called “tracking”, is the capability to find a product based 
on specific criteria while it is handled along each point of the supply chain. This is 
a critical feature of any traceability system because companies must be able to 
identify and locate their products within the supply chain in order to withdraw or 
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recall them whenever necessary.  Once a food item or ingredient has been 
associated with illness, improving forward traceability through the channels of 
distribution can prevent further consumer exposure and prevent additional cases 
of illness.  Additionally, labeling on consumer packaging for manufactured foods 
with information containing lot or batch codes will allow consumers to easily 
identify products in their homes that may be associated with a recall or outbreak. 
 
Limitations of current systems, technology and thinking 
Improving investigatory efficiency requires knowledge of the process of 
investigation; supply chain logistics, food handling and production as well as 
associated technological developments in these areas.  However, recent efforts 
have focused on testing existing food traceability practices and/or augmenting 
these practices with not-well-understood emerging technologies such as radio 
frequency identification (RFID) in the hope that they might offer a ‘silver-bullet’ 
style solution (32,33).  Efforts have also been made to coordinate use of specific 
data elements throughout the supply chain, but with limited success (e.g. 
Produce Traceability Initiative or “PTI”), because there simply can never be a 
one-size-fits-all solution for such a large, complex and dynamic web of supply 
chains (34).  What is needed is a more general framework that can be applied to 
a variety of situations.  This paper proposes that this framework is offered by the 
concept of “Critical Tracking Events.” 
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One-forward-one-back 
Currently, food traceability revolves around the concept of “one-forward and on-
back” (OFOB), which is often also referred to as “one-up and one-down” 
(OUOD).  This approach is popular because it doesn’t require operators to do 
anything other than to maintain customary business records that most operators 
already maintain without the additional consideration of food traceability.  The 
concept of OFOB requires that each operator be able to determine, within a 
reasonable amount of time, and typically within 24 hours, the identities and 
locations of immediate suppliers and customers.  Production records, purchase 
orders, sales orders and invoices as well as shipping and receiving records 
substantially satisfy the basic food traceability requirements of OFOB.   From the 
perspective of the operator, OFOB “works” and requires little if any additional 
investment other than what might normally enhance business productivity in 
terms of improving efficiency of data storage and retrieval.  Without even 
considering traceability, responsible operators already maintain a variety of 
important business process records such as payroll, production, receiving, 
shipping, sales orders, invoices, purchase orders, inventory and quality control 
data.  As mentioned, most of these data are only useful to food outbreak 
investigators after likely sources of contamination have been identified.   
 
Indeed, OFOB does work, but the problem is that it is slow, inefficient and often 
ineffective for investigators, resulting in too many unsolved outbreaks, implication 
of incorrect products, unnecessary damage to industries and brands.    
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A better understanding of the investigative and recall processes helps to 
demonstrate why OFOB is likely to be incapable of substantially improving food 
traceability accuracy and speed regardless of capital investments made.  The 
information contained in business process records simply cannot be collated and 
analyzed quickly enough by investigators to quickly reconstruct the supply chain 
and identify points of convergence.   
 
The investigative and recall process generally begins with epidemiological 
evidence of an outbreak.  As illnesses are being reported, epidemiologists must 
wait to identify genetically related “clusters” of multiple reported illnesses before 
initiating an investigation.  Once one or more clusters are deemed to be 
sufficiently promising to pursue, investigators attempt to discover the most likely 
foods and/or ingredient suspects and their most immediate source (e.g. package, 
store, restaurant, etc.).  Typically, multiple foods and/or ingredients are suspect 
and multiple simultaneous traceback investigations must be initiated. 
 
For each suspect, investigators seek to learn the immediate source of the 
suspect product (i.e. one back).  Requests for information are made from 
suppliers in order to identify subsequent suppliers.  In this manner, investigators 
follow the trail backwards until the source of the outbreak is identified by multiple 
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traces converging upon a particular item and/or location or the trail simply “goes 
cold” (16).   
 
Points of convergence provide investigators with the greatest degree of 
confidence in identifying potential sources of outbreaks.  Once one or more 
points of convergence are identified, and environmental assessment consisting 
of onsite inspections, sampling and testing may or may not confirm the cause 
and a decision must be made whether or not to recall suspected product as well 
as define the scope of the recall.  Then the OFOB process works in reverse in 
order to identify and remove implicated product from the supply chain; typically 
referred to as a product recall. 
 
The problem with OFOB is that it is slow and inefficient.  OFOB is slow because 
investigators must work their way backwards one supply chain node at a time 
and each node may use the customary 24 hours to provide data that identifies 
the next node in the chain.  It is inefficient because investigators must 
simultaneously pursue suspect foods and ingredients that are not a cause of the 
problem and this not only wastes time for investigators, but it also wastes time of 
all operators who receive requests for such data.  As time is spent, people may 
continue to consume contaminated food, the number of illnesses increase and 
the likelihood of confirming the correct source of the outbreak diminishes. 
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Anything done to improve food traceability performance, particularly with respect 
to government regulation, should have the potential to significantly reduce the 
time required to identify points of convergence in the supply chain.  Approaches 
that fail to improve food traceability performance may add substantial costs to 
operators, which are likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
food prices.  Poorly designed or implemented regulations also raise the barrier to 
entry into commerce, thus depressing innovative start-ups and job creation in the 
food industry. 
Limitations of Lot or Batch numbers for traceability 
The role of the “Lot Number” or “Batch Number” serves as a significant example 
to illustrate the consequences and challenges of applying production oriented 
concepts to food traceability.  Most production workers are food safety oriented.  
When food safety is in question, workers tend to focus on lot/batch numbers in 
order to understand the scope of the problem since the lot/batch denotes product 
that was produced or treated under similar conditions using related inputs.  Lot 
numbers are critical when the source of contamination is identified, but since they 
tend to be operator specific and meaningful only to a given operator within the 
supply chain, lot numbers are not particularly useful to traceback investigations 
until a specific operator’s facility is implicated.  Indeed, each operator has 
different definitions of lots and batches and food products often become 
ingredients to other food products making it difficult to recreate paths through the 
supply chain using lot/batch codes.  However, once investigators pinpoint an 
   33 
operator as a likely source of contamination, that operator’s specific lot/batch 
codes as well as all other related information such as payroll (who was working 
that day), storage room temperatures, cleaning records, etc. all become critically 
important to investigators.  Therefore, while food production and food safety 
workers often use lot/batch codes as a central component of food traceability, it 
should now be clear that lot/batch codes are less than ideal for solving the 
logistical food traceability problem. Elimination of the use of lot/batch codes for 
the purposes of production management is not recommended as these data are 
critically important to food traceability investigations, but only when investigations 
lead to a specific food production operation.   
 
Even if not used as a basis for traceability, lot/batch codes will continue to play a 
pivotal role in outbreak investigations once points of convergence or the source 
of tainted food is otherwise identified.  Lot/batch codes will serve as one of the 
key data elements (“KDEs”) for subsequent trace-forward investigations and 
recalls.  However, in an ideal system this KDE need only exist at the operator in 
a form convenient to the operator.  
 
Implementation of the Critical Tracking Event framework requires minimal and 
highly abstracted data (data that are meaningless to observers who are not 
authorized to access secured, related data) to be collected in a format that can 
ultimately be accessible electronically.  Proprietary production data, such as 
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lot/batch codes need not be immediately accessible electronically since the goal 
is to quickly find the source(s) of convergence and/or contamination.  Once 
convergence is identified in the supply chain, thorough investigations will require 
review of all pertinent documentation in all formats.  The goal is to quickly focus 
the investigation, not to burden every operator with unnecessary data collection 
and associated restrictions on data formatting. 
 
The concept of Unique Identification Codes first proposed during the Traceability 
Pilots required by the Food Safety Modernization Act has been met with some 
skepticism from the food industry, but this may be due to a lack of understanding 
how such codes can greatly simplify the traceability process.  Opposition to the 
use of Unique Identification Codes has led to an unending debate over the “ideal” 
universal set of key data elements (KDEs) that might serve the same purpose as 
unique identification codes (35).  Perhaps the only thing that has been concluded 
from all of that effort is that there is no universal set of KDEs that will work for all 
operators in all situations.   
 
Logistical event based approach to traceability – Critical Tracking Events 
The logistics perspective simplifies the supply chain into a series of events 
through which food containing “units” pass.  Units may be shipping containers, 
pallets, cases or individual items.  Therefore, advancing food traceability requires 
a decision as to resolution; what is the smallest and most useful unit to be 
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tracked in the supply chain?  Since consumers typically purchase individual items 
in some form of retail setting, it is likely that the smallest unit received by retailers 
would be an aggregate of individual units, and the most common aggregation of 
individual units is the shipping case (typically a corrugated box containing a set 
number of individual items).  Therefore, advancing food traceability will, at least, 
require some means of uniquely identifying cases.  Since many individual cases 
may represent the same lot, there is an associated need for operators to 
maintain data relationships between production lots and traceability case 
identifiers. 
 
Advancements in food traceability require collection and maintenance of data 
and data relationships and this exposes the need for involving expertise in 
relational data collection, storage and retrieval for advancing food traceability.  
Since the topic of food traceability has been viewed primarily as a food safety 
issue, people with expertise in food safety rather than logistics and distributed 
relational data have played a primary role in drafting regulatory guidelines that 
appear to lack sufficient expertise for flexibility, scalability, adaptability, efficiency 
and interconnectivity that will be necessary to achieve the goal of food 
traceability while offering opportunities for adding as yet unforeseen value in the 
marketplace (35).  Ultimately, a successful global food traceability system will 
need all of these attributes to grow organically and improve over time. 
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Current Frameworks and Standards 
Worldwide standards and frameworks exist to better facilitate traceability 
throughout the supply chain.  These organizations seeks to define data 
standards so that data are collected in a uniform format and can be more easily 
shared between trading partners and other entities in the supply chain (19).  
Ideally, enforcement of standards should be avoided wherever possible in order 
to leave as many avenues for future improvements as possible.  Therefore, to the 
extent possible, conformance with standards should not be required, but rather 
encouraged and/or provided as examples of modern best practices.   
The CTE Framework 
These realizations have led to development of a new framework concept for food 
traceability that offers opportunities to build upon past food traceability efforts, 
tools and technologies into an easily understandable and universally applicable 
approach.  This framework concept is known as “Critical Tracking Events” (CTE) 
(36,37).   The CTE framework provides a basis for flexibility, scalability, 
adaptability, efficiency and interconnectivity with little requirement for enforcing 
specific standards on any operator.   
 
CTE promises to do for food traceability what Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) has done for food safety.  The HACCP concept was developed in 
the 1960s to ensure that food produced for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) was safe.  The HACCP concept widely adopted by the 
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meat processing industry in the 1990s and is now the basis for juice and seafood 
regulations by the FDA (38).   
 
The key concept for CTEs assumes each operator knows their operation best 
and operators are in the best position to identify those events that are critical to 
the overall goal of food traceability.  The CTE concept simplifies the large, 
complex and seemingly intractable problem into a local and familiar series of 
events that are deemed critical to tracking items through an operation.  Each 
operator properly identifies their own CTEs and commits to collecting a minimum 
set of event data for each CTE, typically consisting of a three basic data items 
including, unique location/Event ID (e.g. Receiving Door #2 at a given physical 
address), unique Item ID and date/timestamp.  Each operator would collect event 
data from all of their CTEs and store them as they see fit in secure databases 
that may be accessed for query by properly authorized personnel.  This simple 
structure leads directly to the possibility of authorized investigators being capable 
of generating reports showing locations, dates and times, throughout the entire 
supply chain, of suspect food items and ingredients, virtually instantaneously and 
with minimal intrusion to operators.  When multiple traceback queries expose 
points of convergence in the supply chain, investigators can then focus their 
attention on the broader process and handling data of the implicated operator in 
order to attempt to identify the source of contamination. 
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As with HACCP, the CTE framework does not prescribe any particular method or 
technology.  Operators are free to choose the methods and/or technologies that 
best suit their purposes.  The primary strength of the CTE framework is that it is 
simple, flexible, scalable, secure, and efficient and does not require immediate 
universal participation in order benefit from the system.  As operators adopt the 
CTE concept into their operations, the food supply chains will become 
increasingly traceable.  Additionally, modern distributed data networks preclude 
any requirement for pushing or uploading CTE data to any central repository, 
government, database or authority.  The CTE concept permits operators to 
maintain ownership and control of their own CTE data.  Since unique traceability 
codes can only be linked to proprietary production related data such a lot/batch 
codes, CTE offers a level of security through data abstraction.  This means that 
unique traceability codes have no inherent meaning.  They simply point to a 
richer set of meaningful data in properly secured databases.  Table 2.1 depicts 
the conceptual relationship between HACCP and CTE.   
Data security 
Generally, supply chain participants do not wish to expose proprietary data to 
competitors and most prefer to not be put in a position that requires trust of 
government agencies and/or third parties to secure such data on their behalf.  It 
is therefore, unlikely that the vision of a central data repository controlled and/or 
accessible by FDA or another government entity, to which all food traceability 
data must be pushed, represents a sound solution (35).  A similar effort was 
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envisioned in the 2000s by the USDA to create a national database with all farm 
premise locations and animal movement data to a centralized database to be 
used in animal disease outbreaks.  Resistance from industry and trade 
associations quickly derailed this effort (32).  In contrast, while CTE does not 
prescribe a particular solution for data handling, the CTE framework invites 
development of modern, massively distributed, highly abstracted and secure data 
handling methods.  These modern approaches to data handling provide for 
operator ownership and complete control over their own data.  Data abstraction 
provides inherent top-level security in that exposed codes do not expose 
meaningful information.  Ideally, traceability codes should simply point to 
meaningful data within secured databases that can be physically and logically 
distributed and only accessible to properly authorized personnel with proper 
permissions from data owners. 
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Table 2.1.  Comparison of hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) and critical tracking events (CTEs) 
HACCP CTEs (product tracing) 
Conduct a hazard analysis  Identify products and product inputs to be traced 
Identify critical control points Identify critical tracking events 
Determine critical limits Determine key data elements 
Establish monitoring procedures Establish data collection procedures 
Establish corrective actions Establish data storage procedures 
Establish verification procedures Conduct mock tracebacks 
Ensure recordkeeping Maintain a written record of the product tracing plan 
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Briefly, an example of a CTE distributed data approach involves collection and 
storage of CTE data at the physical location/address of the events.  Operators 
would maintain a database on their own site or contract with a third party to host 
their data in much the same way that many operators contract with third parties 
to host their web presence or to handle critical and proprietary payroll functions 
(Figure 2.4).   
 
Event data would be stored in an operator owned, controlled and secured 
database.  By securely connecting these data servers to the Internet/cloud, 
investigators could use modern and increasingly advanced querying and data 
mining tools with appropriate authentication and permissions and determine 
which events suspect items traversed.  In this manner, investigators will be able 
to rapidly identify paths of different suspect products through the supply chain 
with minimal interruption to operators.  Rapid identification of points of 
convergence would permit timely and focused investigations as well as targeted 
recalls resulting in fewer illnesses and deaths, reduced food waste and less 
overall damage to industries and brands. 
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Figure 2.4.  The CTE framework permits operators to control their own data while making them available for rapid 
traceback investigations without exposing proprietary data.  
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Categorization of CTEs 
The supply chain can be divided into 4 categories of CTE’s namely terminal, 
transfer, aggregation/disaggregation, commingling (Table 2.2). 
Terminal CTEs 
By definition, terminal CTEs exist on the boundary of the supply chain.  Products 
enter and exit the traceable supply chain through terminal events.  Specific 
situations always vary and it is the role of the operator to determine how internal 
linkages are made between CTE data and their actual operation.  For example, 
consider an operation where produce is harvested from a particular field on a 
particular day.  Harvested produce is collected in bulk and delivered by truck to 
an operation involving cooling, washing, sorting/grading and packing.  To do this, 
the operator may use the point where packed cases emerge from the operation 
to initiate supply chain traceability.  This terminal event need not be at the field of 
harvest so long as the operator’s records are capable of leading investigators to 
the source field should that be necessary in the future.  The terminal CTE defines 
entry of this food product into the supply chain.  Again, the CTE could be 
associated with more internal data elements if the operator so chooses such as 
harvest worker, environmental temperature, sampling results and/or other 
relevant production data items.  However, for the terminal CTE, the Key Data 
Elements are simply identification data to define “what, where, when.” 
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Table 2.2.  Four categories of critical tracking events (CTEs); terminal, transfers, aggregations/disaggregations, and 
commingling.   
CTE Category Description Diagram of inputs and outputs at event type 
Terminals 1. Creation, Origination 
2. Disposition 
 
 
Transfers 1. Shipping 
2. Receiving 
 
 
Aggregation/Disaggregati
on 
1. Items ↔case 
2. Cases ↔ pallet 
3. Pallet ↔ Container, Truck, 
etc. 
4. Container ↔ Ship, Rail, etc. 
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CTE Category Description Diagram of inputs and outputs at event type 
Commingling 1. Blend 
2. Formulate 
3. Bulk comingling  
4. Rework 
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Aggregation / Disaggregation CTEs 
Following the Terminal CTE (which in this example occurred at the case level as 
product sorted and packaged), the packinghouse has identified an Aggregation 
CTE in their process.  As cases of product are palletized, an Aggregation CTE 
exists and captures data identifying which cases comprise an individual pallet.  
When pallets are broken down, the process works in reverse in that one 
incoming object (pallet) results in many outgoing objects (cases). 
Transfer CTEs 
For the hypothetical produce harvester, a transfer (shipping/receiving) CTE is 
created when pallets of product are loaded onto a truck for shipment.     
Comingling CTEs 
Comingling is usually an irreversible process where items from multiple sources 
of the same item and/or different items are blended together to create a new 
product.  Comingling CTEs are typically characterized by many inputs and one 
output. 
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Figure 2.5.  Example of CTEs in a simplified produce-packaging facility (terminal, aggregation , and transfer CTEs). 
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Examples of CTEs – Terminal, Aggregation, and Transfer
Product 
Harvested 
from Field
Cooling, washing, 
sorting/grading and packing
Terminal CTE
Product is put into a case
Aggregation CTE
Cases are palletized
Transfer CTE
Pallets are loaded onto 
truck for shipping
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Lot coding considerations using CTEs 
Continuing with the produce harvesting example, the operator must answer the 
“what?” question.  In other words, “what is this item that is being introduced to the 
supply chain?”  First explore why lot numbers are not a good choice for 
answering this question.  The operator is free to define a “lot” in a manner that 
makes most sense to the operation; a shift’s worth of production, a partial shift, 
one or more bulk truckloads, etc.  Whatever the operator uses, it is highly likely 
that any given lot will be subsequently subdivided down the supply chain and 
those operators will have their own definitions for their own lots that make sense 
to their own operations.  In the food industry, the term “lot” is more of an idea 
than a universally defined term.  While this alone should provide a sufficient 
argument against the choice of lot numbers as the core data for traceability, at 
least two additional arguments might be made against use of lot numbers.  First, 
lot numbers are currently elusive when dealing with an unpackaged food or an 
ingredient.  Lot codes are often inconsistent and change meaning throughout the 
supply chain and therefore represent limited utility when conducting a traceback 
investigation.  Lot codes are generally more useful when conducting a recall and 
therefore targeting specific production units in the supply chain.  When the 
source of an outbreak or point of convergence is identified, investigators and 
operators need to know the size of the lot or lots associated with the implicated 
product in order to commence the subsequent investigative process and initiate 
the recalling of food.  Using CTEs, until the source or point of convergence is 
identified, investigators have no need for every operator’s definition of their own 
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lots.  Investigators need an effective means to find points of convergence.  
Another issue with using lot numbers is that they tend to unnecessarily expose 
intelligence about production volumes and inventory turnover to competitors, 
customers and present potential food defense risks.  This may or may not be 
deemed important to any given operator, but operators should be free to choose 
whether or not they wish to expose those data without being forced to do so by 
regulation.  Therefore, while lot numbers currently are critical to the investigative 
process, lot numbers do not represent an ideal means for tracing items through 
the supply chain.  Implementation of the CTE concept throughout the supply 
chain will obviate the need for investigators to focus primarily on lot code 
information as a proxy for internal traceability since case level traceability may be 
more widely available.   
CTE codes 
CTE traceability codes (Table 2.3) answer the “what?” question and should 
simply permit unique identification of an item in the supply chain.  This means 
that the code need not provide rich information about the item, but rather the 
ability to distinguish one item from another in the supply chain.  For example, it is 
now common to use electronic identification to pay tolls on highways.  Drivers are 
issued a device that contains a unique code.  The code itself does not contain 
any descriptive information about the driver or the driver’s automobile.  
Knowledge of the code would not allow someone to know the driver’s height, 
weight or hair or eye color.  The code is simply a number that, when applied to 
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the right database, is able to locate the driver’s database record for billing.  While 
it is likely that descriptive information about the driver exist in the database, but 
only properly authorized personnel may access it.  
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Table 2.3.  Examples of traceability codes:  The codes are represented by the Unique IDs created for each combination of 
CTE type, name, and location.  
Critical tracking events type Name Location Unique ID 
Terminal creation Produce case packer Washing/sorting/packaging Machine XYZ123 
Aggregation – Palletizing Produce palletizer End of conveyor ABC321 
Transfer – Shipping Shipping dock door 2 Shipping dock door 2 DEF456 
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The example of automated toll collection applies directly to the CTE framework.  
The toll collection history shows only the data necessary to identify the item/car 
and its path in space and time (“what?” “where?”, “when?”).  For food traceability, 
this is actually all that is required during the first traceback step of an 
investigation.  For traceability purposes, it doesn’t matter whether the item was 
cheddar cheese or shredded cheese or even cheese.  We simply need a record 
of which CTE’s handled that item with a particular unique traceability code and 
when (“what?”, “where?”, “when?”).  Using this CTE framework, the operator 
associated with the terminal creation CTE for any item could, if asked, provide all 
of the necessary information associated with the creation of the item and its 
introduction to the supply chain (provided they properly associate these data with 
the terminal CTE).  The purpose of the traceability codes is to efficiently direct 
investigators to the operator if associated product might be implicated in an 
outbreak.  Therefore, the best code to be used for traceability has at least the 
following traits: 
1. Globally unique 
2. Least amount of data/bits as possible and practical 
3. Simple to print, write and/or encode 
4. Simple to read 
5. Contains no “meaningful” information about the product or operator (i.e. 
doesn’t carry decodable information such as Julian date, etc.)   
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This lack of meaningful information mentioned in Criteria 5 above is limited to 
traceability code itself, which is assigned at the CTE level for database 
efficiency considerations.  This system generated ID allows for the use of 
preexisting data standards such as the Serialized Global Trade Identification 
Number (sGTIN) which allow for the creation of a globally unique ID.  Since 
this ID is applied to the CTE it in no way precludes or prevents the use of 
exiting product code information such as establishment number for USDA 
inspected products or lot codes being printed directly on products.  This 
information may still be place on a product and would be captured as KDEs 
associated with the appropriate CTEs throughout the supply chain.  The 
continued inclusion of this product code information will allow investigators to 
work quickly with the food industry to pinpoint the implicated CTEs that may 
be relevant in an investigation.    
Technology considerations and platforms 
Defining the “what” 
There are a variety of coding options available that provide reasonable 
guarantees of uniqueness.  One option that has received considerable attention 
was developed as a consequence of advances in RFID technology is the 
electronic product code (EPC).  Through standardization efforts, the EPC is 
widely referred to as a serialized global trade identification number (sGTIN) (39).  
The GTIN has been used widely in the food industry and is most recognizable as 
the UPC code printed on most food packages (Figure 2.6).   
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Figure 2.6.  UPC code including company prefix, item reference number, and mathematically calculated check digit.  
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As with the lot number, the GTIN or UPC code does not identify a specific item, 
but rather a type of product in general.  The sGTIN is a simple modification that 
adds a serial number to the GTIN to provide unique identification of items in the 
supply chain.  GTIN codes and therefore sGTIN codes are managed globally 
through GS1 on a subscription basis.  While GS1 is widely recognized and 
respected, there may be reason for an operator to wish to use another coding 
system now or in the future.  The CTE framework simply requires uniqueness 
while the code exists within the supply chain.  Therefore, the only practical 
limitation on coding systems is ensuring that others in the supply chain can read 
codes.  It is worth noting that the GTIN was established prior to development of 
modern computing technologies and practices.  GTIN and sGTIN codes 
inherently deliver meaningful data within the code such as manufacturer 
identification.  Serialized code data may also provide insight into production 
volumes and rates.  Exposing such data may or may not be desirable to 
operators especially when exposing such information is not necessary under the 
CTE food traceability framework.  Therefore, we recommend operators consider 
alternative coding schemes that simply satisfy the basic CTE requirements. 
 
Contrary to an apparently common tendency to seek enforcement of compliance 
with data standards and structures, readability is the only important requirement 
for achieving CTE based traceability.  Standardized data formats may offer some 
limited benefits, but as long as trading partners are capable of reading codes of 
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other trading partners, whether similar in structure to their own or not, CTE based 
traceability can be accomplished.  There is no technical reason that all supply 
chain participants use similar identifying data types or structures.  Modern 
computer applications are very well suited for generating unique identification 
codes.  Therefore, many readily available options exist for generating unique 
identification codes under the CTE framework. 
 
Defining the “where and when” 
With the ability to assign unique identification codes to items in the supply chain 
the question of “where?” and “when?” can be answered.  Each CTE represents a 
repetitive event that occurs at a specific location.  At worst, the location can be 
defined by the physical address of the operator.  At best, it can be defined by the 
specific location within the operation where the event takes place such as a piece 
of processing equipment or warehouse shelf.  Often, the event is defined by a 
particular machine that is bolted to the production floor.  Extending the prior 
produce harvesting example (Figure 2.5), the terminal creation event might occur 
on the output side of the cooling/washing/sorting/packing operation where cases 
emerge on a take-away conveyor prior to being palletized.  The operator could 
choose to apply pre-printed and coded labels (manually or automatically), directly 
print codes on cases, print and then apply labels to cases, etc.  However, as 
codes are applied, it is possible to uniquely identify the location of the event as 
well as capture a date-time stamp for each occurrence.   
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Again, GS1 offers a data standard for uniquely identifying locations known as the 
global location number (GLN) (40) however, any unique identification number 
chosen to describe the CTE location is sufficient to achieve CTE based 
traceability. 
 
As an operator identifies, instruments and documents CTE’s within the operation, 
it becomes clearer how proprietary data remain secure while meaningless 
identification codes are used to point to rich sets of data within operators’ secure 
organizations.   
 
For the simple example of the harvest operation (Figure 2.5), three CTE’s are 
identified including a terminal CTE (creation), and aggregation CTE (palletization) 
and a transfer CTE (shipping).  The operator’s proprietary records would 
describe these CTE’s perhaps, as shown in Table 2.3. 
The CTE event record for the Terminal Creation CTE using unique item code 
“789” would be shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4.  Example of Terminal Creation critical tracking event showing the creation of an event record that records the 
“where, what, and when” related to the creation of a product. 
Where? What? When? 
XYZ123 789 
January 31, 
2013/13:50:23 
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Similarly, the aggregation-palletizing CTE would record “789” being associated 
with the specific pallet.  The shipping CTE would record the pallet being shipped.  
When the product arrived at the next operator, their receiving CTE would record 
arrival of the pallet.  When the pallet is broken apart, the case identified as “789” 
would be recorded as being removed from the pallet, etc.  There is no need to 
attempt to predict the path of the item through the supply chain since each 
operator records CTE data themselves.  
 
Ultimately, consumers might purchase sandwiches made with produce from 
Case “789.” Other cases from the same production lot would have likely arrived 
at many other retailers.  Using the unique case identifiers, investigators should 
be able to query the distributed CTE food traceability system essentially asking, 
“which CTE’s handled Case ‘789’?”  The few CTE’s that actually handled the 
item could alert operators that an affirmative response to an investigative query 
must be made.  At this point, the operator can provide either a quick “Yes, we 
handled Case ‘789’” or a more robust response with all dates, times such as “Yes 
we saw the item at [CTE location XYZ123] on [Date/Time].”   
 
The dataset compiled from all CTE’s will provide a relatively immediate physical 
and temporal mapping of the item through the supply chain allowing investigators 
to quickly visualize the path and timing of multiple suspect items through the 
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supply chain.    In many situations, the CTE framework is even capable of 
jumping over missing nodes, which means that the traceability system will be 
immediately useful and improve over time as individual operators come online 
with their CTE data.  The CTE framework is capable of satisfying the objective to 
quickly focus investigator attention on points of convergence rather than working 
backward, serially through the cumbersome OFOB process with associated 
delays at each stop. (Figure 2.7) 
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Figure 2.7.  Simple conceptual diagram of traceback investigation.  In this investigation, product is traced back to a point 
of convergence at Farm A.  
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Modern interconnectivity of computer networks via the Internet as well as cloud 
based storage and computing permit relational databases to exist virtually 
anywhere (41).  Availability of this highly distributed global data infrastructure 
obviates the notion of a large central food traceability database.  Small-scale 
operators could still capture these data by hand, if need be, or by the ubiquitous 
smart phone with appropriate applications (42).   
 
The CTE food traceability framework fits well with the modern notion of highly 
distributed data while promoting additional benefits of operator’s maintaining 
ownership and control of their data as well as the associated data security that 
ownership and control affords. 
Distributed vs. Centralized Data 
While the CTE framework doesn’t necessarily prescribe use of distributed data 
versus centralized data, it is easy to recognize the benefits of the distributed 
model over a centralized model.  A centralized model requires that all supply 
chain participants conform to the central data model as well as central interface 
protocols. Operators would need to push data to the central database in a timely 
manner.  Since all operators would be expected to interact with the central 
database, necessary changes over time would be extremely difficult to 
implement.  Therefore, central databases tend to be inflexible, not easily scalable 
and therefore, become quickly obsolete.  On the other hand, the distributed 
model permits operators to maintain ownership and control of their own data.  
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Simple interfaces permit investigators to make infrequent queries of data and 
operators are capable of controlling the scope and manner of responses.  
Operators maintain and upgrade their systems as appropriate without interfering 
with the rest of the supply chain in much the same way that companies can 
upgrade their own websites without interfering with the rest of the Internet.  In 
contrast to the central database model, the distributed data model is flexible and 
scalable.  Leveraging the modern distributed data infrastructure will permit rapid 
and independent expansion and utilization of CTE based food traceability. 
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Figure 2.8.  Conceptual diagram of CTE Traceability backbone.  CTEs can be identified by leveraging cloud-based search 
algorithms and distributed databases.  Unique traceabiltiy IDs would be identified by these same search techniques and 
using these IDs, convergence in the supply chain is quickly identified.   
   69 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   70 
Conclusion 
Past outbreaks have demonstrated the need for more rapid and accurate food 
traceability.  Using existing standards and technologies, and adopting the CTE 
concept of traceability would allow industry and regulators to intervene in 
outbreaks and prevent additional cases of foodborne illness.  CTE allows for 
more targeted food recalls, potentially limiting the amount of unaffected food that 
would need to be recalled and destroyed.  In turn, better traceability based on the 
CTE framework will result in increased public confidence in the food supply since 
implicated or adulterated food would be rapidly identified and removed from sale.   
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Introduction 
In the United States, an estimated 63,000 cases of E. coli O157:H7 infection 
occur every year, including approximately 3,700 laboratory-confirmed cases and 
20 deaths (28,43).  E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks have been primarily associated 
with ground beef and leafy green vegetables, reflecting both the primary reservoir 
and environmental spread of the agent (43).  The apparent complexity of E. coli 
O157:H7 reservoir systems results in unusual or new food vehicles, such as 
cookie dough and mechanically tenderized steaks, being periodically 
documented through outbreak investigations (44,45). 
 
Food supply chains are integrated at the point of consumption. Complex foods 
may contain a combination of globally sourced and locally produced ingredients. 
Ingredients from a single supplier may be incorporated into hundreds of different 
products.  These complex food systems present a considerable challenge for 
analytic epidemiologic investigation methods in which exposures have typically 
been analyzed at the level of a specific food item or commodity rather than by the 
source of the commodity or ingredient.  This lack of detailed exposure 
information can limit the ability of an analytic study to identify and confirm the 
vehicle of outbreaks caused by commercially distributed food items. 
 
Tracing the distribution pathway of suspect food items to their respective 
production sources has been a critical part of epidemiologic outbreak 
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investigations, providing the food exposure specificity necessary to identify the 
outbreak vehicle (13–15). 
 
In February 2011, a multi-state cluster of E. coli O157:H7 cases with isolates of 
the same pulsed-field gel electrophoresis subtype (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [CDC] Xba1 designation EXHX01.1159, Bln1 designation 
EXHA26.3665) was identified in Wisconsin (four cases), Minnesota (three 
cases), and Michigan (one case) (46). 
 
Hypothesis-generating interviews conducted by public health agencies in each 
state, along with re-interviews of each case with additional specific questions 
about a number of food items, identified that in-shell hazelnuts was the only food 
item consumed by all cases. In some instances the hazelnuts were purchased as 
part of a mixed nut product. However, brand names for the hazelnuts were not 
available as in each instance they were purchased from bulk bins in grocery 
stores. Due to the unavailability of brand information and the higher than 
expected rate of reported hazelnut consumption among cases (47), investigators 
determined that tracing back the hazelnuts for all of the cases in an attempt to 
identify to a common distribution source would be the fastest and most effective 
way to test the epidemiological hypothesis and facilitate an effective public health 
intervention.   
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We describe here the criteria and methods used to conduct these tracebacks and 
consequently confirm in-shell hazelnuts as the outbreak vehicle.   
Materials and Methods 
 
 Case Definition and Follow-up 
A case was defined as a person who had an E. coli O157:H7 isolate with the 
outbreak PFGE pattern (EXHX01.1159, EXHA26.3665) and who had illness 
onset on or after December 1, 2010. State-specific hypothesis-generating 
questionnaires were administered by each state, and patients were re-
interviewed several times about consumption of various specific food items.  
Traceback Investigation 
The Wisconsin Division of Public Health (WDPH) and the Minnesota Department 
of Health (MDH) initially discussed the E. coli O157:H7 cluster on February 4, 
2011 (Figure 1).  On February 11, 2011, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture 
(MDA), MDH, WDPH, the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection (WDATCP), the Michigan Department of Agriculture 
(MDARD), and the Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH) 
conducted a conference call to share updated case exposure histories, discuss 
suspect food items, and plan further investigation approaches.  During this call it 
was decided that the Minnesota and Wisconsin state regulatory agencies would 
initiate traceback investigations of in-shell mixed nuts (in all instances the mix 
consisted of in-shell hazelnuts, walnuts, almonds, and brazil nuts) and in-shell 
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hazelnuts consumed by cases to determine if product distribution data could 
confirm the epidemiologic hypothesis that hazelnuts were the outbreak vehicle.   
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Figure 3.1.  Timeline of the epidemiologic and traceback investigation starting on 3 February 2011 and concluding on 5 
March 2011, when the outbreak PFGE pattern was identified from a hazelnut sample collected from a case patient’s 
home.  Agency acronyms:  WDPH, Wisconsin Department of Public Health; MDH, Minnesota Department of Health; MDA, 
Minnesota Department of Agriculture; CDPH, California Department of Public Health.   
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MDA contacted the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) to inform 
them that a distributor in California (distributor C) was a point of convergence in 
the traceback investigation. On February 25, CDPH conducted an inspection of 
this distributor and collected invoices and other records to identify the source of 
this distributor’s in-shell mixed nut and hazelnut products.  
 Record Collection 
Table 3.1 lists the type of information that was collected by MDA, WDACTP, 
MDARD and CDPH (48).  Records during this traceback investigation were 
collected in-person by field investigation staff and remotely by phone, e-mail or 
fax.  The records collection time window was based on case exposure 
information, product shelf life, and product residence time in the supply chain.  
 
Each regulatory agency obtained invoices from each retailer where a case had 
reported purchasing either in-shell mixed nut or in-shell hazelnut products. A 
traceback target time frame from November 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010 was 
established, and invoices for all bulk in-shell nuts within this time frame were 
requested from each retailer. 
 
The MDARD food inspection staff visited the Michigan retail store to obtain 
invoices. WDATCP and MDA contacted retail locations and distributors both in 
person and by telephone, and invoices were obtained in person, by fax or e-mail.   
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Table 3.1:  Type of records and information that should be collected during a traceback investigation. 
Information Type Type of records or information 
Record Collection  Examples of records that typically need to be collected include, but are not 
limited to: invoices, shipping and receiving records, bills of lading, inventory 
record queries, label information, packaging type and size, lot codes, UPC or 
GTINs, and production dates. 
 
Product ordering and 
shipping 
 How and when product is ordered? 
 How much of the product is used or shipped daily? 
 What is done if the establishment runs out of product before another 
shipment is received (e.g., purchase from grocery store, request more from 
supplier, etc.)? 
 How are deliveries and receipt dates recorded? 
 Compare the shipping dates to the dates received; Determine suppliers 
during the time period of interest, including cash transactions.  
 What is the transportation time from supplier(s) to the establishment? 
 Was the product re-packed during distribution? 
 
 
Product Storage and 
Handling 
 How is the product unloaded and added to existing inventory?   
 Is the suspect food item used as an ingredient in preparation or manufacture 
of another food item? 
 How is stock inventory recorded?   
 How are partial cases/containers accounted for if carryover is recorded?  
 What does each inventory number represent?  
 Review the standard procedures for stock rotation and determine if the facility 
is capable of internal traceability or follows a first-in-first-out (FIFO) model. 
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MDA investigators contacted a distributor in Minnesota by telephone and e-mail 
and requested invoice and purchase order (PO) records pertaining to this 
distributor’s source of in-shell nuts that would have shipped to six retail stores 
where case-patients had purchased in-shell hazelnuts or in-shell mixed nuts.  
WDATCP contacted a Wisconsin distributor by telephone and e-mail and 
requested invoice and purchase order (PO) records and bills-of-lading pertaining 
to this distributor’s source of in-shell nuts that corresponded to product shipped 
to a retail store where a case-patient had purchased in-shell mixed nuts. 
 
Wisconsin and Minnesota investigators analyzed product distribution information 
to identify shipments most likely associated with illness, based on case-reported 
purchase and consumption dates. 
 
An iterative approach was used in Minnesota to collect traceback information, 
similar to that used in epidemiological investigations (21,49). This approach, as it 
applies to traceback investigations, involves confirming product distribution and 
receipt backwards through the supply chain to confirm that product that was 
shipped was actually received.  This involved verifying that documents related to 
incoming shipments matched the quantities and descriptions of the outgoing 
shipments, one step back in the supply chain.  Where discrepancies were 
identified, investigators contacted both entities in the supply to seek clarification.  
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A traceback diagram that included case onset dates, case purchase dates, 
product description, quantities, shipment and receipt dates, invoice and PO 
numbers, and notes on case exposures or product handling practices was 
constructed (Figure 3.2).  Figure 3.2 has been simplified for publication to include 
only the shipments and product exposures most likely to have been associated 
with human illnesses.     
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Figure 3.2.  Traceback diagram for E. coli O157:H7 1102WIEXH-1 cluster investigation of seven cases in three states. 
The hazelnuts were traced back to two packing facilities and did not undergo further processing at the distributor or retail 
level. The mixed nuts were made by distributor C and included the same hazelnuts from the packing facilities. Distributor 
A assigned unique identifiers based on purchase order number (PO #), which created internal traceability and facilitated 
rapid traceback. This figure depicts shipments limited to 2 weeks prior to a case’s approximate purchase date and does 
not represent all of the hazelnuts or mixed nuts distributed during the outbreak investigation. 
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Laboratory Investigation 
A sample of in-shell bulk hazelnuts was collected from one case household and 
tested by the MDA using the standard method, which involves a PCR screen 
followed by culture confirmation incorporating IMS isolation techniques (44). One 
50-pound bag of hazelnuts and one 50-pound bag of walnuts were collected from 
the California distributor by the CDPH during on onsite inspection. Wisconsin 
DATCP collected in-shell hazelnuts from a case household as well as a 50-
pound bag of in-shell mixed nuts from a Wisconsin distributor that was returned 
after the California distributor announced its recall (50).   
 
Results 
Traceback Investigation 
Tracebacks were completed for seven of the eight cases linked to the cluster 
(Cases A-G, Figure 3.2); the eighth case reported an exposure to the implicated 
hazelnuts but was detected in Wisconsin after the products had been recalled. 
Each case reported either an in-shell mixed nuts or in-shell hazelnut exposure, 
and no case reported consuming both products prior to illness onset. Four (57%) 
cases reported the purchase of bulk in-shell mixed nuts and three (43%) reported 
purchase of bulk in-shell hazelnuts.   
 
The purchase dates reported by the cases ranged from December 16, 2010 to 
January 7, 2011, although five cases reported purchase dates around December 
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25, 2010. Each case reported purchasing nuts from a separate retailer (retailers 
A-G).  
 
Six retailers (86%) reported purchasing nuts from a common distributor 
(distributor A).  The one (14%) retailer who did not receive in-shell nuts from 
distributor A, received in-shell mixed nuts from a distributor in Wisconsin 
(distributor B).  Both distributor A and B received 100 percent of their in-shell 
mixed and hazelnuts from a common third distributor C during the investigation 
timeframe.   
 
Among the six retailers that received in-shell mixed nuts or in-shell hazelnuts 
from distributor A in the two weeks prior to case purchase, one (14%) lot of in-
shell mixed nuts was shipped to multiple retailers (A, B, and F). This common lot 
(Lot x20-04 in Figure 3.2)  was in three (75%) retail locations two weeks prior to 
patient purchase dates and was the only shipment to two (50%) of the retail 
locations associated with mixed nut exposures.  The source of the hazelnuts in 
Lot x20-04 of mixed nuts could not be directly traced to an incoming shipment of 
hazelnuts at the California distributor (distributor C) due to a lack of internal 
traceability. However, based on the documented first-in-first-out (FIFO) product 
handling practices at distributor C, it is likely that the hazelnuts received on 
November 22, 2010 from packer B or on November 24, 2010 from packer A were 
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the likely source.  Given the volume of hazelnuts received from packer A, it is 
more likely that packer A was the source of the contaminated hazelnuts. 
 
There were no common lots of in-shell hazelnuts shipped to all retailers during 
the two weeks prior to case purchase dates.  Based on shipments to retailers C, 
D, and E, it is likely that product received at distributor A on or after December 
10, 2010 was most likely to be associated with illness, and these shipments also 
traced-back to product received at distributor C on November 22, 2010 and 
November 24, 2010.   
 
Initially, retailer C denied that distributor A supplied any hazelnuts to the store 
during the investigation time frame.  After repeated phone interviews with the 
quality assurance (QA) manager for retailer C and the QA manager for distributor 
A, a single shipment of hazelnuts to retailer C occurring on December 14, 2010 
was identified.  
 
Ninety-eight percent (124,000 pounds) of in-shell hazelnuts that distributor C 
distributed during the target timeframe were received from packer A while less 
than two percent (1750 pounds) came from packer B (a single shipment received 
on November 22, 2010).  A specific hazelnut grower was not identified during the 
traceback investigation because packer A did not provide records to the 
regulatory agencies.  However, during the course of the investigation packer A 
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indicated that between 20 and 60 growers might have provided product that 
shipped to Distributor C in the timeframe of interest and Packer A sourced only 
domestically harvested hazelnuts.   
 
Some 50-pound bulk bags of hazelnuts at distributor C received from packers A 
and B were used to make the in-shell mixed nuts shipped to distributors A and B.  
Those hazelnuts not used to manufacture mixed nuts at distributor C followed an 
approximate FIFO pattern of shipment.  Records at distributor C were not of 
sufficient detail to link incoming shipments of hazelnuts from packers A and B to 
outgoing shipments of mixed nuts and hazelnuts to distributors A and B.   
Recall Announcement 
 
On March 4, 2011 distributor C issued a voluntary recall of all hazelnuts and 
mixed nut products distributed from November 2 to December 22, 2010. Recalled 
product was distributed to stores in seven states: Minnesota, Iowa, Michigan, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.  
 
Regulatory and health agencies in Minnesota and Wisconsin issued press 
releases on March 4, 2011 to inform the public. All persons who had recalled in-
shell hazelnuts were encouraged to discard them or return them to the store.  
MDA and WDATCP provided a list of stores where recalled product was sold 
based on distribution records obtained during the traceback investigation.  
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Laboratory Investigation 
 
On March 5, 2011, the MDA laboratory reported isolation of E. coli O157:H7 from 
bulk in-shell hazelnuts collected from a case patient’s home; on March 7, the 
isolate was determined to match the outbreak pattern by PFGE and MLVA. The 
outbreak strain of E. coli O157:H7 was also isolated from an intact in-shell mixed 
nut sample collected from an intact 50-pound bag collected from distributor B by 
WDATCP on March 11, 2011.  WDATCP also isolated Shiga toxin-producing E. 
coli (STEC) O64:H34 from an intact in-shell mixed nut sample collected from a 
50-pound bag from distributor B. CDPH isolated the outbreak PFGE subtype of 
E.coli O157:H7 from an in-shell mixed nut sample collected from an intact 50-
pound bag from distributor C.  Because of inadequate recordkeeping at 
distributor C, investigators could not definitively link positive product samples to a 
particular incoming shipment from packer A or B.  The FIFO practices and 
quantity of product received suggested that the 40,000 pound shipment from 
packer A to distributor C on November 24, 2010 likely contained the 
contaminated bolus of hazelnuts.   
Discussion 
This was an outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 infections associated with bulk in-shell 
hazelnuts sold at retail food locations in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. 
This is the first recognized E. coli O157:H7 outbreak associated with nuts. 
However, previous Salmonella outbreaks or recalls have been associated with 
almonds, pistachios, and peanuts (6,7,46,51–53). 
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Regulatory agencies have historically conducted tracebacks to determine the 
source of a product after laboratory confirmation of the etiologic agent in food or 
after the food item was epidemiologically associated with illness in an analytic 
study.  This outbreak demonstrates the usefulness of starting a traceback 
investigation before the food can be definitively implicated, with the goal of 
confirming a suspected association by identifying a common source via a point of 
convergence in the food supply. By starting earlier in the course of an 
investigation than is traditional, this type of traceback can provide meaningful 
information that can shorten the course of the investigation and lead to an earlier 
public health intervention.  
 
The following criteria were used to determine if a traceback investigation was 
warranted as part of the epidemiologic investigation: 
1. A PFGE subtype cluster of cases likely represented a common source 
outbreak;  
2. Cases occurred in multiple locations or jurisdictions (in this instance, 
multiple states);  
3.  Interviews of case-patients revealed no obvious point-source exposures in 
common (e.g., they did not eat at the same restaurant or attend the same 
event), suggesting that the outbreak vehicle was a commercially 
distributed food item; and  
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4.  A suspect food vehicle was identified and the frequency of exposure 
among cases provided a strong hypothesis that could be directly tested by 
identifying a common production source for exposed cases.  
 
The following criteria were used to determine which mixed nut and hazelnut 
exposures should initially be traced: 
1. The likelihood that the exposure was truly the exposure of interest for a 
case; 
2. The availability of clear, documented details on the exposure; and 
3. Geographic and/or temporal dispersion of case exposures with the goal of 
identifying multiple food distribution chains during the traceback.  
In this outbreak a common PFGE subtype cluster was identified, cases occurred 
in three states with unique retail exposures, bulk nuts were epidemiologically 
suspected and identifying a common source of production was determined to be 
the fastest and most effective way to test the epidemiological hypothesis.  Each 
case represented a unique retail exposure and all were traced with the same 
priority.    
 
Bulk in-shell nuts, like many produce items, were not labeled and therefore the 
consumer could not report brand information when interviewed. In order to 
accurately identify commonalities associated with the hazelnut exposures, a 
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traceback investigation was required. Because identifying a common distribution 
source was the most direct way to test the epidemiological hypothesis and 
maximize the public health intervention, the tracebacks needed to be conducted 
rapidly. The outbreak strain of E. coli O157:H7 was ultimately isolated from in-
shell hazelnuts and mixed nuts containing in-shell hazelnuts. However, 
laboratory confirmation occurred after the tracebacks confirmed the 
epidemiologic hypothesis and thereby enabled investigators to implicate 
hazelnuts and prompt the recall and public advisories.  
 
Multi-state outbreaks in which cases are not uniquely associated with a single 
retailer suggest that the source is a commercially distributed food and that the 
source is not primarily associated with on-site environmental or food-worker 
contamination.  Although food workers and environmental contamination need to 
be addressed, in these types of outbreaks priority should be given to rapid 
tracebacks through record collection related to product receipt and distribution in 
order to identify common suppliers throughout the supply chain.  
 The Importance of Internal Traceability 
Distributor A possessed good internal data systems and provided accurate 
summary reports of their complete distribution.  Using the iterative investigation 
approach, a review of distributor A’s records identified a shipment of in-shell 
hazelnuts to retailer C that was originally and repeatedly denied by retailer C 
during the initial stage of the investigation.  This shipment was significant 
   93 
because it was the only shipment received by retailer C of in-shell hazelnuts and 
represented the exposure associated with the related case’s illness as well as 
the positive home sample.  This demonstrates the importance of re-interviewing 
companies and re-analyzing the distribution data when there’s an apparent 
discrepancy.   
 
A common source was identified in this investigation by defining implicated 
shipments corresponding to case purchase dates and tracing these shipments 
back from retailers through distributors to a repackaging and distribution 
operation (distributor C).  While this operation (distributor C) was not likely the 
original source of adulteration, it did represent a common point of convergence 
for all cases in terms of product distribution.  Distributor C received over 99 
percent of their in-shell hazelnuts from packer A, located in Oregon.  Ninety-nine 
percent of domestically harvested hazelnuts are grown in Oregon (54). 
 
Product handling practices at distributor C complicated the traceback 
investigation.  Distributor C did not maintain records that would allow 
investigators to link an incoming shipment of bulk nuts to an outgoing lot of 
finished product when manufacturing mixed nuts.  
 
Packer A did not maintain adequate internal traceability records to allow 
investigators to adequately identify a subset of farms that provided hazelnuts 
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during the timeframe of interest.  Without access to these records, investigators 
were unable to conduct environmental assessments of the farms that supplied 
packer A to identify possible sources of contamination or adulteration.  
 
The lack of internal traceability within the food processing industry and among 
distributors is not uncommon (1,55).  The passage of the federal Food Safety 
Modernization Act in January 2011 increases recordkeeping requirements and 
may improve internal traceability in the future (18).   
 
Distributor A maintained internal traceability and assigned a unique lot number to 
all incoming products based on the purchase order and item number of incoming 
product (Figure 3.2).  This internal traceability allowed investigators to trace 
product in retail stores directly back to specific incoming shipments from 
distributor C to distributor A.  If this level of traceability were available throughout 
the entire supply chain it would be possible to easily identify a farm or producer 
as the source of contamination.  Specifically, the positive hazelnuts collected 
from the Minnesota case household came from a single identifiable shipment to 
retailer C on December 14, 2010.  Because this was the only shipment to this 
location and the hazelnuts tested positive, complete supply chain traceability 
would have identified the farm where the product was grown and harvested.    
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This outbreak investigation illustrates the importance of collaboration between 
epidemiologists and regulatory officials within individual states, and between 
states.  Regular conference calls were held among MDA, MDH, WDATCP, 
WDPH, MDARD, MDCH, CDC and FDA to discuss common exposures among 
cases and share traceback information as the evidence was collected and 
developed.  Given the small number of cases, the likelihood that a single state 
could have implicated in-shell hazelnuts was small. 
 
Similarly, detailed communication among regulatory agencies increased the 
speed and accuracy of the investigation. MDA was in regular communication with 
CDPH once distributor C had been identified during the traceback investigation. 
CDPH’s inspection of distributor C and record collection prompted a recall of the 
adulterated product on March 4, 2011, three weeks after the initial conference 
call between MDA and WDPH (Figure 3.1). 
 
Hazelnuts are mechanically harvested from the ground. Processing practices 
may vary by facility, where some may be treated with an antimicrobial wash prior 
to the drying process.  The risk of fecal or environmental contamination of the 
outside of the hazelnut is highly plausible. Previous outbreaks of fresh produce 
have been associated with fecal contamination of fields by wild animals and 
domestic ruminants (27,56).  In this instance, it’s plausible that feces from wild 
deer or domestic cattle grazing in the orchards contaminated the surface of the 
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hazelnuts prior to harvesting.  No published data exist on the survivability of E. 
coli O157:H7 on in-shell nuts, but the traceback evidence suggests that the 
organism remained viable for at least three months from the time of initial 
distribution to when the home sample tested positive on March 5, 2011.  There is 
evidence that Salmonella can persist for days to weeks on nutshells and in 
orchard soils (57–59).  In pecans and almonds, Salmonella can infiltrate a 
damaged shell and remain viable in the kernel for over a year after drying 
(60,61). 
 
This investigation was timely and resulted in the recall of adulterated product, but 
it was limited by inadequate recordkeeping by distributor C and packer A, which 
did not allow for the identification of the farms that were the ultimate source of 
contamination. Without access to this information, investigators were unable to 
physically investigate and assess potential sources of contamination.   
Better recordkeeping and internal traceability within the food industry will improve 
the timeliness and accuracy of future traceback investigations. The hazelnut 
industry benefited from implicated product being traced to a single distributor and 
a limited number of packers, rather than hazelnuts in general. Several recent 
outbreaks associated with tomatoes, spinach, and sprouts have seen consumer 
advisories that target an entire commodity group (3,27,62).  Importantly, this 
outbreak demonstrated how a collaborative multi-jurisdictional rapid traceback 
investigation significantly reduced the time required to identify the source of 
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adulterated product and initiate a meaningful public health intervention. The 
isolation of pathogenic STEC from recalled product suggests that additional 
human illnesses were prevented as a result of the investigation and subsequent 
recall.   
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Introduction 
In the United States, an estimated 1,027,000 cases of nontyphoidal Salmonella 
enterica infection occur every year, including approximately 42,000 laboratory-
confirmed cases and 378 deaths (28). Nontyphodial Salmonella outbreaks have 
been associated with a wide variety of foods including fresh produce, 
manufactured foods and milk and meat products (3,4,6,7,53,63–65).  Similarly, 
outbreaks due to Salmonella enterica serotype Newport have been associated 
with a wide variety of foods; produce items (e.g., tomatoes, alfalfa sprouts, 
mangos, lettuce) have frequently been implicated (5,66–68).  
 
Produce in the food supply chain often moves without an associated lot code or 
other identifying information (69). Given the relative anonymity of fresh produce 
in the supply chain, consumers often cannot remember a brand name if they 
become ill after consumption and no longer retain the product packaging. The 
use of shopper-card information associated with consumer purchases can assist 
public health and regulatory investigators in identifying specific products likely 
associated with illness since all transactional purchase data are collected and 
stored against a shopper-card number. The use of these data has been valuable 
in investigating past foodborne illness outbreaks (2,64,70). 
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On August 4, 2010, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Public Health 
Laboratory (PHL) notified MDH epidemiology staff of two Salmonella Newport 
isolates, from clinical samples, collected two days apart, with indistinguishable 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) patterns (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [CDC] XbaI designation JJPX01.0041) identified through routine 
surveillance. Over the next two days, the MDH PHL identified three additional 
isolates with the same pattern. All five specimens were from females over 50 
years of age from the same small city in northwestern Minnesota. A search of the 
national PulseNet database revealed that 19 additional case isolates with this 
PFGE pattern had been detected in 8 other states, almost exclusively in the 
Southeastern United States where S. Newport is endemic.      
 
We describe here the investigation of the outbreak, which identified fresh 
blueberries as the cause. Specifically, the use of supplier-specific 12-digit Global 
Trade Item Numbers (GTINs) (71) identified a single blueberry grower linked to 
cases, corroborating the results of an analytic study which statistically implicated 
blueberries.  
Materials and Methods 
Epidemiologic Investigation 
 
Methods for Salmonella surveillance used by MDH have been well documented 
(49). Briefly, submission of clinical isolates to MDH PHL is required by state rule, 
all isolates are subtyped by PFGE in real time, all cases are interviewed as soon 
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as possible with a detailed exposure questionnaire about exposures in the 7 days 
prior to symptom onset (including brand names, varieties, and point of sale or 
service locations of foods), and clusters are investigated using an iterative model. 
 
In this outbreak, a case was defined as a person from whom Salmonella Newport 
with the outbreak PFGE pattern was isolated from a specimen collected after 
July 15, 2010. Hypothesis-generating interviews were conducted by MDH, and 
patients were re-interviewed several times about consumption of various specific 
food items and other potential common source exposures.  
 
On August 6, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) was notified of the 
S. Newport cases, and requested MDH to obtain purchase history information 
from retailer A based on shopper-card numbers provided by consenting cases 
(Figure 4.1).  Case consent was obtained at the time of the telephone interview; 
cases voluntarily provided shopper-card information to MDH with the knowledge 
that it would be shared with MDA for the purpose of accessing purchase records.    
A case-control study was initiated on August 10 to evaluate food items frequently 
reported by cases. Four controls for each case were recruited using phone lists 
generated using reverse-directory of addresses in the same geographic area as 
the case’s home. Controls were restricted to females over 50 years of age who 
reported no diarrhea or vomiting since the week preceding the matched case’s 
illness onset date. Matched odds ratios were calculated for each of the 13 food 
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items on the questionnaire; each analysis excluded enrollees who could not 
recall whether or not they were exposed to that item. Statistical analyses were 
conducted using SAS software (SAS Institute, Cary, NC) with p < 0.05 
considered to represent a significant exposure association.   
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Figure 4.1.  Timeline of the Salmonella Newport outbreak and traceback investigation. Shipments of the suspected 
blueberries were shipped from Georgia to Minnesota on July 5, 2010. The investigation definitively determined the source 
of the blueberries on September 17, 2010, after point-of-sale data were used to determine that a critical invoice had not 
been provided concurrently by retailer A and wholesaler C earlier in the investigation.   
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  Traceback investigation 
 
MDA initiated a traceback investigation to collect documents, records, and 
information using previously described criteria (16). To collect information 
quickly, records and data were requested using the phone or e-mail whenever 
possible, but it was also necessary to visit some of the implicated facilities to 
obtain additional records. Shopper-card information was requested to link 
product purchases to specific dates in order to verify information provided by 
cases during the epidemiological interviewing process. Verbal consent was 
obtained from cases by MDH to share shopper-card information with MDA. 
 
On August 9, purchase histories for five shopper-cards were requested from 
retailer A; these five card numbers corresponded to four cases (one case had 
two shopper-card numbers). Copies of purchase receipts within a month prior to 
illness onset from cases were provided to MDH and forwarded to MDA. While 
waiting for retailer A to provide shopper-card information, on August 10 MDA also 
requested invoices for all blueberries received at retailer A between June 26 and 
July 23. On August 16, an MDA inspector conducted an onsite inspection of 
retailer A to verify that contamination of the blueberries was unlikely to have 
occurred at retailer A.  
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MDA also interviewed retailer A to determine the typical timeframe between 
when blueberries are received at the store and when they are sold or have 
exceeded their expiration date.  
 
On August 19, following the identification of a sixth case by MDH, MDA 
contacted a second retailer (retailer B) to obtain invoice and blueberry handling 
information for approximately two weeks prior to the case’s known purchase 
date. On August 19, retailer B provided invoices for blueberries received from 
wholesaler C between July 1 and July 12, 2012. 
 
An onsite inspection at wholesaler A, a primary supplier to retailer A, was 
conducted on August 19, 2010 to verify that contamination of the suspect 
blueberries was unlikely to have occurred at wholesaler A (Figure 4.1).  
Based on the UPC sales reports provided by retailer A, on August 23 an MDA 
investigator called retailer A to understand how these UPCs are entered and 
recorded.  
 
Once UPC GTIN data was collected from retailer A, an online database of trade-
item ownership (http://gepir.gs1.org) was accessed by investigators. Global 
Electronic Party Information Registry (GEPIR) is a unique, internet-based service 
that gives access to basic contact information for companies that are members of 
GS1. GS1 is an international not-for-profit standard setting organization 
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responsible for the design and implementation of global standards and solutions 
to improve the efficiency and visibility of supply and demand chains globally and 
across sectors. These member companies use GS1's globally unique numbering 
system to identify their products, physical locations, or shipments. By entering a 
product bar code number into GEPIR, one can find the owner of that barcode's 
contact information.  Physical location numbers and shipment numbers can also 
be used as search criteria in this system (72).  
Results 
Epidemiological Investigation 
 
During hypothesis-generating interviews of the first five cases, none of the cases 
reported any common restaurants, gatherings, events, civic groups, or faith-
based organizations during the week before illness onset. On interview, the first 
five cases reported shopping at the same grocery store (retailer A), which had a 
customer shopper-card program.   All five cases had consumed fresh 
blueberries, in the week before illness onset four reported frequent fresh 
blueberry consumption, and three specifically reported consuming fresh 
blueberries purchased in 1 pint (16 oz.) clamshell containers from retailer A.  
 
These 5 cases and 20 controls were enrolled in the case-control study. 
Consuming fresh blueberries was statistically associated with illness (5 of 5 
cases vs. 8 of 19 controls; matched odds ratio [mOR], undefined; p=0.02). 
Consuming fresh blueberries from retailer A was also statistically associated with 
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illness (3 of 3 cases vs. 3 of 18 controls; mOR, undefined, p=0.03).  None of the 
other 12 food items on the questionnaire were statistically significantly associated 
with illness.    
 
On August 17, a sixth case was identified by MDH through routine surveillance. 
This case, also a female over 50 years of age, resided in a town located 50 miles 
from the small city where the first five cases resided. This new case also reported 
consuming fresh blueberries prior to illness onset. She reported purchasing 
blueberries in 1-pint clamshell containers from a different grocery store (retailer 
B) than the other five cases; retailer B did not have a shopper-card program.  
 
All six cases were female, with a median age of 66 years (54 to 82 years). Illness 
onset dates ranged from July 17 to August 4, 2010 (Figure 4.2). One case was 
hospitalized for 4 days.   
Traceback Investigation 
 
On August 9, shopper-card reports confirmed blueberry purchases from retailer A 
for three of the cases prior to illness onset. Case 1 purchased 2 pints of 
blueberries on July 14, Case 2 purchased 2 pints of blueberries on July 13, and 
Case 3 purchased 12 pints of blueberries on July 14 (Table 4.1). No shopper-
card information was available from Case 4 because the case did not use a 
shopper-card for purchases prior to illness onset. Case 5 was unable to be 
interviewed directly about shopper card information due to the severity of her 
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illness. Invoices collected from retailer A showed blueberries received from two 
suppliers in July prior to the start of illnesses: wholesaler A and wholesaler B. 
 
In a telephone conversation with MDA, the manager of retailer A stated that 
blueberries sold on July 13 and July 14 would likely have come from incoming 
invoices dated July 10, 12, and 13. The invoice dates were the same as the 
shipping dates, and product from the July 10, July 12, and July 13 suppliers was 
shipped and received the same day (Figure 4.2). Records showed the last 
shipment of blueberries prior to July 10 was on July 3. As of August 16, before 
Case 6 had been identified, the information provided by retailer A led to a 
presumed link to a blueberry grower in Michigan (grower A) (Figure 4.2).  
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Table 4.1.  Shopper-card numbers for three human cases of illness associated with fresh blueberry purchases between 
July 11 and July 17, 2010 from retailer A.  All three cases purchased GTIN (UPC) AAAAA600111. 
 
Human Cases GTIN (UPC) Description Visits Quantity Sold 
Case 1 AAAAAA600111 Berries – 
Blueberries  
1 2 
Case 2 AAAAAA600111 Berries – 
Blueberries  
1 2 
Case 3 
 
BBBBBB900690 Berries – 
Blueberries  
1 3 
AAAAAA600111 Berries – 
Blueberries  
1 9 
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An inspection at retailer A found no reported employee illness in the timeframe 
prior to the cases’ illnesses. The inspector verified that blueberries were never 
repacked at the store prior to sale. An assessment of the walk-in produce storage 
cooler, retail display cooler, and produce processing area was conducted, and no 
issues were observed.  
 
On August 20, Case 6 provided a receipt documenting a purchase of fresh 
blueberries from retailer B on July 15, and retailer B was contacted by MDA and 
provided invoices for blueberries received between July 1 and July 15, 2012. All 
blueberries had been provided by a single wholesaler (wholesaler C) and a 
single grower (grower B) (Figure 4.2). At this point in the investigation, a common 
source of blueberries for Case 6 and the previous cases was not evident (Figure 
4.2).  
 
On August 20, MDA received Point-of-Sale (POS) GTIN information for all 
blueberries sold at retailer A from July 11 to July 17 associated with all available 
case shopper-card purchase data. In addition, retailer A provided a count of the 
units sold by GTIN for July 13 and July 14, the dates when the three cases with 
shopper-card information purchased blueberries (Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2.  Total units of fresh blueberries (16 oz.) sold by retailer A on July 13 and July 14, 2010.  GTIN (UPC) 
AAAAAA600111 were purchased by all three cases from whom shopper-card data were available. 
  
Fresh Blueberries (16 oz) Units 
Sold 
PLU and GTIN 
(UPC) July 13, 2010 July 14, 2010 
4240 0 54 
XXXX322001 0 0 
XXXX322101 15 0 
BBBBBB90069
0 103 291 
AAAAAA60011
1 433 378 
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The universal product code (UPC) barcode on the blueberry clamshell packages 
encoded a 12 digit number (GTIN-12) unique to each brand and product 
combination, which allowed it to be scanned and recorded at checkout and 
associated with individual shopper-card numbers. At the time of inquiry, retailer A 
had 17 UPCs recorded in their system for blueberries. All three cases for which 
shopper-card information was available had one common GTIN: AAAAAA600111 
(Table 1). Using the GTIN GS1 barcode look-up database, this UPC was found 
to be associated with grower B located in Alma, Georgia. Importantly, this UPC 
POS information was inconsistent with the invoice information collected from 
retailer A since the provided invoices did not identify any shipments that traced 
back to grower B. In other words, grower B did not match any of the suppliers of 
blueberries for retailer A identified by the traditional traceback methods of 
reviewing invoices, bills-of-lading and product handling practices (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2.  Traceback diagram created initially in the investigation based on first-in-first-out product rotation and 
traditional traceback methods of analyzing invoice, bill-of-lading, and product handling practices. Based on this 
information, a common source of blueberries for all cases could not be identified. 
   116 
   117 
On August 26, MDA received POS GTIN information from retailer B, the store 
where Case 6 had a receipt confirming the purchase of blueberries on July 15. 
The GTINs for all fresh blueberries sold on July 15 at Retailer B matched the 
GTIN for cases 1, 2, and 3 associated with retailer A: AAAAAA600111. This 
GTIN was the only GTIN sold at retailer B on July 15 (Figure 4.3). Therefore, 
GTIN and traditional traceback records collected from retailer B were in 
agreement, and both sources of information implicated grower B. 
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Figure 4.3.  Point-of-sale GTIN information from retailer B for sales of fresh blueberries (16 oz.) from July 11 through July 
17, 2010. Case 6 provided a receipt from retailer B showing a purchase date of July 15, 2010. Only GTIN 
AAAAAA600111 was sold on July 15 and this GTIN matched the shopper-card purchase information from three cases 
who shopped at retailer A. 
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On September 3, MDA investigators contacted grower B to request information 
on fresh blueberry shipments to wholesaler C on or prior to July 15. On 
September 15, MDA investigators contacted wholesaler C to request all records 
showing shipments of fresh blueberries to retailer A on or prior to July 15. MDA 
received verbal indication that they had sold no blueberries to retailer A during 
that timeframe. However, because the GTIN information from retailer A did 
indicate that grower B blueberries had been sold at retailer A, and wholesaler A 
was known to have received grower B blueberries, MDA sent an inspector to 
retailer A on September 17 to look for missing invoice information. During that 
visit the inspector hand reviewed all invoices in the facility and found an invoice 
from wholesaler C indicating that they had supplied retailer A with fresh 
blueberries on July 13. After sharing this invoice with wholesaler C, who had 
previously denied shipment to retailer A, the matching records for the July 13 
shipment were located and confirmed by wholesaler C and sent to MDA (Figure 
4.4).  The missing invoice was located in the files of retailer A but had been 
missed by employees at both retailer A and wholesaler C after phone and e-mail 
requests for records.  Only the on-site visit by the MDA inspector and a thorough 
review of all records produced the missing invoice.  
 
Grower B shipped blueberries to Minnesota twice, on July 5 and July 10 (Figure 
4.4). Both shipments originated in Alma, Georgia. Therefore, the GTIN 
information collected from retailers A and B definitively identified grower B.  
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Figure 4.4.  Modified traceback diagram created after shopper-card and point-of-sale GTIN information identified a single 
blueberry grower common to a majority of the human cases. Based on this information, investigators identified grower B 
as the likely source of the outbreak.  
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MDA investigators notified the FDA Minneapolis District Office of their traceback 
investigation. Since no new cases were detected in Minnesota and due to the 
limited shelf life and growing season of the implicated blueberry product, no 
formal recall was requested of grower B. No cases in other states were linked to 
blueberry consumption.  
 
Discussion 
 
This was an outbreak of Salmonella Newport infections associated with 
consumption of fresh blueberries. We could find reference to only one previous 
outbreak of salmonellosis associated with blueberries – a multistate outbreak of 
14 Salmonella Muenchen cases in 2009 reported in the CDC Foodborne 
Outbreak Online Database (73).Because case numbers in our outbreak were 
small, and because blueberries were not a well-documented vehicle of 
salmonellosis, it was important to corroborate the statistical association found in 
the case-control study by determining that the blueberries consumed by cases 
originated from a common source. The methods used to detect and investigate 
this cluster, including the traceback methods, once again proved very effective in 
determining a novel vehicle of foodborne disease even with relatively few cases 
in the outbreak (16,45). However, methods used to rapidly trace back suspected 
food products as part of an epidemiologic investigation are evolving (15), and 
valuable lessons about this process were learned during this investigation. 
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In many outbreak investigations, exact purchase dates are difficult to obtain or 
verify. The use of shopper-card data by investigators helps narrow the focus of 
the investigation to specific purchase dates and can be used to link customer 
purchases to incoming shipments to the retailer. Since these data are queried 
from databases, they tend to represent a more reliable measure of temporal 
exposure when compared with case recall during a phone interview. In the 
absence of shopper-card data, product that cases were most likely exposed to is 
typically determined by first-in-first-out (FIFO), an inventory method designating 
that the oldest product on the shelves should be sold first. There is often minimal 
documentation of whether a firm is accurately and consistently following FIFO, 
and therefore an investigator’s links between the dates a product is sold and the 
incoming invoices are frequently based on employees’ assumptions of 
throughput and sales. Based on initially incomplete evidence in this investigation, 
the invoices pointed to wholesaler A and grower A based on FIFO. However, 
when point-of-sale (POS) data were analyzed and linked to shopper-card 
information, a common GTIN was identified. This finding revealed the likelihood 
that not all invoices had been provided by retailer A in the initial data request, 
and led to additional investigation both at retailer A and wholesaler C. The 
discovery of additional records at these locations documented the supply chain 
from grower B to wholesaler C to retailer A, thereby shifting the focus of the 
investigation from grower A to grower B. The current reliance on a paper-based 
on-up/one-back system of traceability between trading partners demonstrates 
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real world data gaps since both retailer A and wholesaler C had inadvertently 
failed to provide records that would have immediately implicated grower B. 
 
Blueberries are somewhat unique compared to other fresh produce products 
since they are not usually repackaged or sold in bulk at retail, but are sold in 
clamshell packages that have a UPC barcode. Because product from several 
blueberry growers can be available for sale in a single retail setting within a short 
timeframe, this presents an opportunity to use shopper card, GTIN and POS 
information in an investigation. This situation allows investigators more 
opportunity to find a common lot code or GTIN associated with illness. Other 
packaged fresh produce products such as sprouts, raspberries, blackberries, and 
strawberries may have similar sales characteristics. The unique GTINs allowed 
investigators to differentiate between individual purchases as well as see, in 
aggregate, which GTINs were sold on a particular day. Of note, once a common 
GTIN had been identified, determining the brand owner for that GTIN required 
additional analysis by MDA investigators since the company that originally 
registered the GTIN had since merged with another entity. 
 
This investigation demonstrates the emerging concepts of Critical Tracking 
Events (CTEs) and Key Data Elements (KDE) (37) related for food product 
tracing. These concepts could be critical in rapidly tracing food though the supply 
chain and solving outbreaks. The POS data, essentially a CTE, represents 
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transactional event data that associates the sale of a product to an individual at a 
point in time. Simply put, this shopper-card CTE identifies “who” purchased 
“what” and “when”. In this traceback investigation, GTINs, shopper-card 
numbers, dates and times represent the KDEs needed to link a product to a case 
of illness. It should be noted that all the data accessed by regulators in this 
investigation were originally created for business purposes (sales information, 
marketing, etc.) and not originally intended by industry to be used for traceability. 
However, the use of these data and the event data that were queried by 
investigators demonstrates the potential utility of consciously designed CTEs and 
KDEs at critical points in the supply chain to better facilitate product tracing. 
  
Also, because the blueberries were packaged and marked with their GTIN 
information on the consumer packaging and because this GTIN information was 
recorded at the POS, investigators were able to query the trade-item ownership 
using a public online database. Under different circumstances, even if invoice 
information from retailer A and wholesaler C had not been missing, this 
information could still have allowed investigators to bypass steps in the supply 
chain and identify the source more quickly. 
 
The passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act requires most entities in the 
supply chain to maintain better traceability records for high-risk foods, and this 
outbreak demonstrates the ability of investigators to use these data to more 
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effectively identify the source of an outbreak. This outbreak suggests that even 
modest improvements in food traceability can be made by businesses properly 
defining CTEs and capturing KDEs. The use of CTEs and KDEs would greatly 
improve the speed and accuracy of outbreak and traceback investigations.  
  
In conclusion, this outbreak investigation involved only six cases and only two 
retailer locations, but this proved sufficient to conclusively identify the source as 
blueberries and link all the exposed cases to a common grower. The 
investigational efficiencies gained by incorporating product tracing as part of an 
epidemiological investigation cannot be understated. Many larger multistate 
outbreaks could be solved more quickly if coordinated and concentrated product 
tracing was routinely conducted by public health and regulatory agencies in 
states with even a few cases (4,6). In this instance, the use of POS UPC and 
GTIN information was a critical component of the traceback investigation. This 
type of information represents a rapid, specific source of data and should be 
routinely sought and incorporated into food traceback investigations. The food 
industry should also consider points in their processes where CTEs could be 
implemented to better facilitate product tracing.    
 
Because fresh produce items are highly perishable, some may question the 
importance of finding the source of the issue, given that by the time this occurs 
the outbreak is generally over and therefore there is no immediate public health 
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impact.  However, successfully tracing an implicated product to its source allows 
regulatory and public health officials to conduct a root cause analysis or 
environmental assessment to determine how the product may have initially 
become contaminated and prevent future contamination events.   
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Chapter 5.  Summary 
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This first paper presented in this dissertation proposed the need and subsequent 
structure for improved traceability in the food supply chain by employing the 
concept of Critical Tracking Events (CTEs); specifically Terminal, 
Aggregation/Disaggregation, Transfer and Comingling CTEs.  This paper 
develops a conceptual framework needed to improve the timeliness and 
accuracy of data collected throughout the food supply modeled after a similar 
approach used in the development of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP).  Through the systematic use of Critical Tracking Events, food 
operators are able to analyze their individual processes and identify points to 
collect “what, where, and when” data and create a Unique Traceability Code that 
can serve as a unique data identifier throughout the supply chain.  This system 
would allow public health investigators to use distributed databases and cloud 
based computing systems to rapidly query the food distribution system looking 
for spatial and temporal commonalities for suspected food items in an outbreak.  
The primary benefit of implementation of CTEs to the food industry is not to 
immediately improve food safety but to increase operational efficiency.  However, 
by implementing appropriate CTEs throughout the supply chain, public health 
investigators and regulators can use this information to quickly find points of 
convergence of products implicated in an outbreak and make an intervention, 
which prevents additional illnesses from occurring.   The development of this type 
of product tracing system is mandated by the Food Safety Modernization Act and 
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is designed to build on data and recommendations stemming from pilot studies 
involving produce and processed manufactured foods.   
 
The second paper in this dissertation documented the first known cases of E.coli 
O157:H7 associated with a nut product while also proposing methods for the type 
of records and information that should be collected as part of a traceback 
investigation used to rapidly test an epidemiological hypothesis.  In this outbreak, 
seven retail food locations, six (86%) in Minnesota and one (14%) in Wisconsin 
received suspect hazelnut or mixed-nut (containing hazelnuts) shipments from a 
distributor in Minnesota and Wisconsin, respectively.  Records were collected 
from retail and distribution facilities in Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan, and 
traced back to a single distribution center in California.  Because of comingling 
practices at the distribution center in California and the lack of Critical Tracking 
Events to capture Aggregation/Disaggregation or Comingling CTEs the firm was 
required to initiate a product recall. The majority of hazelnuts received at the 
California distributor came from a packing operation in Oregon.  This packing 
operation, due to process and recordkeeping gaps, also lacked CTEs that would 
have allowed for the identification of a suspect farm or group of farms.  This 
investigation demonstrated how regulatory and public health investigators used 
well defined epidemiological and traceback methods to trace suspect products 
back through the supply chain.  The investigation also demonstrated how a lack 
of CTEs and the corresponding “what, where, and when” information prevented 
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investigators from determining the ultimate source, likely a farm, in this outbreak.  
Had the source farm been identified, an environmental assessment may have 
identified the root cause of contamination and provided guidance to the hazelnut 
industry on how to prevent E.coli O157:H7 contamination in the future.   
 
The third paper describes an outbreak of S. Newport associated with blueberries 
involving the novel use by investigators of Global Trade Item Numbers in the 
form of Universal Product Codes to identify the source grower for the outbreak.  
Six cases of confirmed illness, all occurring in Minnesota, purchased blueberries 
from two retail locations.  Early in the investigation regulators use “traditional” 
sources of data to attempt a traceback; invoices, bills-of-lading, and shopper 
receipts.  Shopper-card information and point-of-sale transaction data queried 
from the retailers’ data systems allowed investigators to identify a supplier-
specific 12-digit GTIN that was linked to case purchases and corroborate the 
results of case-control study in which fresh blueberry consumption was 
statistically associated with illness (5 of 5 cases versus 8 of 19 controls, matched 
odds ratio [MOR] undefined, P = 0.02).  In this investigation the shopper-card 
information represented a CTE at the retail store because it identified “what” 
(GTIN) product was sold to “whom” (shopper-card number) and “where and 
when” (retail location and date and time of sale) this transaction occurred.  This 
investigation demonstrates how investigators can determine the source of an 
outbreak can use CTEs, and a limited set of transaction data, KDEs.  
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In conclusion, food traceability is complicated and inconsistent throughout the 
food supply chain because of existing business processes, cost and the lack of 
regulatory requirements for collecting these data.  Several nationwide outbreaks 
in the 2000s resulted in the passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act which 
required the FDA to create a product tracing system and the food industry to 
collect more information to better facilitate traceability.   
 
The primary objective of this research is to characterize and propose how data 
could be more systematically defined and collected throughout the food supply 
chain to more rapidly determine the source of foodborne illness outbreaks.  
Building on the concepts that the food industry has used implementing HACCP 
plans, this dissertation proposes a similar structure that can be used to identify 
and create CTEs that capture a small amount of “what, where and when” data in 
a format convenient to the food operator.  Additionally, the regulatory and public 
health communities can improve current traceback investigations by more 
methodically collecting data and food handling practice information from existing 
data sources.  Finally, if investigators and public health officials approach a 
traceback investigation looking for possible undefined CTEs in the supply chain, 
they may identify unique or novel opportunities for analyzing data sources not 
previously considered.   
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It will take a significant period of time for the food industry to adopt and 
implement the concepts of CTEs throughout the supply chain and even longer 
before regulatory officials have a centralize search tool to query these data.  In 
the meantime, investigators can used the methods and concepts described in 
this dissertation to solve traceback investigations more quickly and potentially 
limit the number of illnesses in a some foodborne outbreaks. 
Future Research 
As the CTE concept gains acceptance in the food industry additional research 
demonstrating how the CTE can be implemented would be useful.  This research 
could involve a combination of the development of “Pilot Plants” as well as 
discrete event simulation to create computer models that demonstrate how data 
are systematically collected using CTEs and how Unique ID codes can be shared 
within companies and between food operators.   
 
Pilot Plants are used in the food industry to test new processes and products and 
this concept could be extended to testing CTE data collection within a variety of 
food operations; produce packing sheds, warehouses, and food manufacturers.  
These small-scale plants could mirror larger processes in the real-world and 
demonstrate how operators may systematically collect data at predetermined 
CTEs with the goal of minimally impacting existing production processes.   
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Computer simulations of product supply chains, both within a processing facility 
and representing transactions and shipments between companies, could be 
developed using discrete event simulation software.  Such software can create 
visual representations of the food supply can show where and how data can be 
most effectively collected to improve food traceability.  These software can be 
tailored to almost any situation and could help food operators design a cost-
effective and high-performance system with minimal impact on production 
practices or product throughput.   
Building on the research described in this dissertation and with additional 
research, food traceability can be improved with the secondary benefit of 
protecting public health when outbreaks do occur.  Rapidly tracing food products 
associated with illness to their sources can prevent additional illnesses for that 
outbreak and root cause analyses can prevent future illnesses.   
 
Specific recommendations for improving food traceability include: 
1. The food industry should analyze current processes and determine where to 
implement CTEs and collect a small amount of “what, where, and when” data 
– Key Data Elements – and develop methods to share these data between 
food operators in the supply chain. 
2. Regulators should methodically collect data and information related to product 
tracing using currently available data sources.  Standardization of these 
   136 
investigatory methods, even in the absence of industry available CTEs, would 
reduce the time and increase the accuracy of traceback investigations. 
3. Investigators should look for CTEs when conducting investigations by fully 
understanding an operator’s product handling processes and what data are 
currently collected as part of these processes.  This understanding by the 
investigator may allow for the identification of novel or nontraditional data 
sources to be used in a traceback investigation.   
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